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*INTRODUCTION
On the morning of October 28,1925, in a shabby structure
known as the Emory Building, in Washington, D. C. , a distinguished
military leader and war hero faced a General Court-Martial on
charges of insubordination. From that day until the 17th of
December the eyes of the nation would be focused on the makeshift
courtroom and on the colorful figure of the accused, Colonel
William Mitchell, onetime Brigadier General and Assistant Chief
of the Army Air Service. A skillful flier with an outstanding war
record, Mitchell was also an unorthodox and extremely outspoken
soldier. For years a center of controversy, he had criticized his
superiors in terms so bitter that this climactic trial became
inevitable.
The court-martial of Billy Mitchell has remained a contro-
versial chapter in American history. Writers are no nearer agreement
today in evaluating this episode than they were in 1925. By his
partisans, Billy Mitchell is still described as a hero and a martyr,
as many so regarded him at the time of the trial and before. To others
he has always seemed a mountebank, an opinionated gadfly, a divisive
force. Mitchell was granted a posthumous vindication when World War II
substantiated many of his predictions, but in respect to his theories
only. Whether or not he was right to speak and act as he did,
whether he was really justified in the conduct that led to his
court-martial, are still moot questions. They are questions that
1
2might well be asked in connection with other military officers
in later years. They are questions that lie at the heart of
military relationships and concern the dichotomy of the individ-
ual's convictions versus official policy, dedication versus
discipline, the man versus "the system*.
I! fStrangely enough, it is not even agreed today whether
Billy won or lost his fight. It is by no means certain whether
he could have achieved his aims in any event. At this late date
the question may even be raised, whether or not the whole sad
v
Mitchell episode might have been a monstrous irrelevancy having
no bearing one way or the other on the development of national
defense. This possibility, suggested by one of Mitchell's
1
staunchest supporters, General Henry H.Arnold, may well be close
to the truth. If Billy Mitchell's ordeal was, in fact , irrelevant
and unnecessary, it becomes a personal tragedy of the highest
order, and deserves to be considered in that light. If, indeed,
Billy was less a martyr than a suicide, then human values assume
greater importance than military issues. If injustice was done,
it may be traceable on the one hand to Billy's failure to reach
a rapport with the military system of which he was a part, and on
the other hand to failure of the system to understand the motiva-
tions of an unorthodox and highly articulate individual.
Billy Mitchell was neither the first nor the last high-
ranking officer to be involved in a public disagreement with his
1
Arnold, Henry H.
,
Global Mission
, pp. 121-122.
9. Ku
asuperiors. The mercirlal George Armstrong Custer had been discip-
lined and demoted for his outspoken views in the post-Civil War
period. So had George Crook. Between 1939 and 1963 wrangles over
military policy or weapons were common, and highly placed men
like Admirals Arthur B. Radford and Hyman Rickover, Generals
Douglas MacArthur and James M. Gavin engaged in public contro-
versies which might easily have placed them uncomfortably close
to Mitchell's position. The climate of the times was different,
however, and the temper of these officers and their superiors
possibly more moderate. Possibly, too, these officers were not
quite as far "ahead of their times ' as was Mitchell according to
a time-worn cliche. The issue, however, has always boiled down
to the same thing: individual judgment versus official policy.
Ml cases have, in varying degrees, exemplified the terrible
dilemma of the dedicated professional soldier who sees his views
disregarded and his advice rejected. Where does his loyalty
properly lie? To his service, which demands his unswerving
obedience? Or to his country, which depends for its safety on
the benefits of his training, experience and judgment? How far
can he go in fighting -or what he believes is right? At what point
must he say 'Yes, sir 7 and fall back into ranks, to support a
policy he earnestly believes is wrong? Regardless of wnich course
an officer elects to follow, the question remains - how is history
to judge the rightness of his actions? is the final criterion to be
merely the validity of his views, or does this matter at all?
Rather, should it be deemed that his personal honor alone is the
standard by which he should be judged? This dilemma remained
4unresolved by the 1925 court-martial, and persists in military
and political relationships to the present day.
People elect a military career for a variety of reasons.
Some see it as affording the opportunity for an active, venturesome
life, away from civilian routine. Some, consciously or unconsciously,
find in it a legal outlet for aggressive, combative tendencies.
Many sooner or later recognize it as an orderly, ordered pattern
of existence that relieves them of the necessity for personal
decisions, where "the book" is the Gospel and the chain of command
a philosophy of life. Some, like "Stonewall" Jackson, show a
remarkable adeptness in using the system as a ladder to greatness,
others shrewdly use it as a shield to cover their own inadequacies
and under this aegis achieve the appearance of greatness . Official
policy, as reflected in military regulations and in the programs
of our service academies, has abetted this approach. The very
rigidity of a regulated life can be considered at its best as
insuring standardization and discipline, at its worst as producing
stultified thinking and setting a premium on mediocrity.
At the other end of the spectrum from the "book" officers
is a totally different breed of professional military men. These are
men who are fascinated by some particular phase of military opera-
tions or some particular weapon, sufficiently so to make a life's
work out of becoming an expert in their chosen field. They are the
technicians, the specialists, and the mechanization of warfare
has brought them into their own. They are the spiritual heirs of
the bowmen and cavalrymen^of years past. The "book" holds no
magic for them, they scorn entrenched procedures, generally
5abhor protocol. Their chief limitation derives from their very
dedication to the weapon or service in which they are so expert.
Their loyalty, like their knowledge, tends to be intensive rather
than comprehensive. In their enthusiasm and crusading zeal they
tend to lose a certain proportion and breadth of vision, and they
are inclined to identify themselves solely with one technique
of warfare.
In this basic conflict between the military career man
and the specialist, between the soldier and the technician, lies
much of the acrimony of mid-twentieth century military disputes,
yet a modern armed force needs both points of view. Without the
one, there would be little progress; without the other there
would be no balance. As the engines of war have come more and
more to outweigh the men who use them, the specialists have achieved
a measure of ascendancy. World War I was fought to a conclusion
by the soldiers, World War II by the technicians.
To some extent the public has become converted to the cult
of the machine, and its changing temper has been reflected in its
changing attitude toward military leaders. The heroes of the past
were essentially textbook soldiers. Washington, Jackson, Lee,
Sherman, Pershing were professional field commanders, not weapon
enthusiasts. On the other hand, the saviors of today and tomorrow
are scientists, inventors, technicians: Wernher von Braun, a cap-
tured enemy asset and far-sighted space technician; Admiral Rickover,
unorthodox and controversial "father of the atomic submarine";
Generals Curtis E. LeMay and Thomas S. Power, wielders of thunder-
bolts of automated nuclear destruction; General Bernard Schriever,
6brilliant organizer of research and development; General Gavin,
airborne foot-soldier and articulate prophet of "vertical envelop-
ment". Interestingly enough, each of these men has had his argu-
ments with his military and civilian superiors, but none became
a Billy Mitchell. They won their points because their government
believed them. In this sense, probably more than in any other,
Mitchell was indeed "ahead of his time". Mitchell fought bitterly
for dreams that were not yet ready to be translated into reality.
He spoke with a sense of urgency that his nation could not be
persuaded to share, and with Quixotic idealism he relentlessly
pushed his cause all the way to the point of self-immolation.
^ So, on this October day in Washington, a hero had reached
the ultimate crisis of his military career. Seated erect yet
relaxed between his civilian and Army counsel at the defense
table, attired in his breeches and boots and his unorthodox
easy-fitting blouse with its wide lapels and oversize patch
pockets, his chest ablaze with the decorations of three nations
and his prized A.E.F. pilot wings, he looked the picture of
competence and confidence. Facing him across the polished expanse
if i
—
of the long court table sat the twelve general officers who were
to determine his fate. To Mitchell's right, but close by in this
crowded courtroom, Colonel Sherman Moreland, Trial Judge Advocate,
read the charges to the court.
"..Violation of the 96th Article of War in that Colonel
William Mitchell made statements prejudicial to good order and
military discipline. . .
"
7™ (The charge sheet contained fifty three pages of text, all
built around a two-thousand word statement Billy had released to
the press on the 5th of September , 1925, and a subsequent statement
on the 9th. The Specifications to the Charge alleged that these
statements constituted conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline, were insubordinate to the administration of
the War Department, highly contemptuous and disrespectful, and
uttered with intent to discredit said administration, as well as
2
the Navy Department.
^ In spite of the ponderous verbosity of the charges, Billy
had commented that he was being tried under the same article that
3
would apply had he kicked a mule.
This reaction epitomized the trial. It was the final ordeal
of a military leader who had never been brought to heel, a brash but
brilliant adventurer confronted by the stern judicial processes
of an orderly military caste. It was a confrontation between Army
men of a totally different stamp, and the nation found itself
compelled to take sides.
The Mitchell story is part of the American legend. It tells
v
of the birth pangs of military aviation, of the awakening of the
nation to a new age. Most of all, though, it is part of the continu-
ing drama of the inherent conflict between the traditional military
virtues and the American ideal of individualism. It is the story of
a classic clash between the school of "Yes, sir; No, sir; No excuse, sir"
and "The man who wouldn't shut up."
2
Charge Sheet -Mitchell Court-Mar tial, Library of Congress
(see Fig. I)
3
Mitchell, Ruth, My Brother Bill , p. 311.
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Extract from Charge Sheet of General Court-Martial
Charge : Violation of the 96th Article of War.
Specification 1 . In that Colonel William Mitchell, Air Service, did
at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on or about the 5th day of September, 1925,
conduct himself to the prejudice of good order and military discipline
and in a way to bring discredit upon the military service by making,
uttering and publishing to Harry McCleary, A. H.Yeager, Kenneth McCalla
and to the Associated Press and in the San Antonio Express, a
public journal, and in divers other public journals of the United
States, a statement which in its entirety reads in substance as follows
Specification 2 . In that Colonel William Mitchell, Air Service, on
or about the 5th day of September , 1925, did make a statement
Insubordinate to the administration of the War Department, and did
utter and publish said statement:
Specification 3 : In that Colonel William Mitchell, Air Service, om
or about the 5th day of September , 1925, with intent to discredit the
administration of the War Department, did make a statement highly
contemptuous and disrespectful of said administration, and did utter
and publish said statement: ....
Specif ication 4 . In that Colonel William Mitchell, Air Service, on
or about the 5th day of September , 1925, with intent to discredit the
administration of the Navy Department, did make a statement highly
contemptuous and disrespectful of said administration, and did utter
and publish said statement:
All of which was conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline.
Specifications 5,6,7,and 8 : The same, with reference to public
statement uttered and published by Colonel William Mitchell, at
Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on or about the 9th day of September , 1925
.
Accuser: (signed) Kyle Rucker , Lieutenant Colonel
JUdge Advocate General's Dept.
Chief, Military Affairs Section
Judge Advocate General's Office.
Referred to Colonel Sherman Moreland for trial October 21,1925
by: (signed) A, E. Saxton
Adjutant General
Charges served on the accused October 28,1925, by
:
Capt . K. J. Fielder
Acting Adjutant
Military District of Washington.
Figure I.
9CHAPTER I
WHO WAS BILLY MITCHELL? (1898-1911)
V 1
"A Nicole who has made his mark". Of the many things
Billy Mitchell was called during his turbulent life, this was
perhaps the only reference that called attention to his birthplace.
For Billy was indeed born a Frenchman, in a geographical sense
at least. On December 29th, 1879 he was born in Nice, on the French
\ Riviera, and for the first eleven months of his life he lived in
a house called the Maison Corinaldi, on the Place Grimaldi, a
building which today still bears a plaque to his memory. Billy's
parents, John Lendrum Mitchell and his wife, the former Harriet
D. Becker, were spending a protracted honeymoon in Nice when
young William arrived. Years later, during the Great War, the happy
accident of Billy's French origin would be a factor which would
help endear him to the French people, but in 1880 it was a peaceful
world as Billy left for his family home in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
The Mitchells were influential people in Milwaukee', thanks
largely to the activities of Billy's grandfather, Alexander Mitchell,
a bearded patriarch and vigorous lawyer who had had his history
of brushes with vested authority. In fact, in the course of his
championing of the rights of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railroad, Alexander Mitchell had been publicly castigated by no
less a figure than the elder Senator Robert M. LaFollette for
2
"brazen defiance of the law". A gentler facet of the family
1Unidentifled clipping from English language Nice newspaper
- Mitchell Papers .Container 22, Library of Congress.
2Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit
. ,
p. 27.
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tradition was evidenced by Billy's father, a humanitarian who
later rose to the position of United States Senator. The family
political tradition was Democratic, one which Billy never saw fit
to change. In a strange crossing of paths, the Mitchells' acquain-
tances in Milwaukee included the family of General Arthur MacArthur,
whose son Douglas was one of Billy's boyhood friends.
Z
In 1895 Billy completed his early education in Milwaukee
schools and entered George Washington University. World Ivents,
however, were to interfere before he could complete his college
course. The destruction of the U.S. S. Maine and the subsequent
declaration of war against Spain in 1898 constituted outside dis-
tractions that Billy could not pass up. He left George Washington
and returned to his home state to enlist.
3 rOn May 7th, 1898, less than a week after Commodore George
Dewey's spectacular victory in Manila Bay, William Mitchell's
military career began. Brash and thirsty for action, he enlisted
as a private in Company M of the First Wisconsin Infantry Regiment
and left almost immediately by troop train for Jacksonville, Florida,
to begin training at the tent-city called Camp Cuba Libre.
Like the other training camps hastily set up for the war
against Spain, Camp Cuba Libre presented a picture of chaos. On the
subject of these camps, Brigadier General M.B.Stewart was later to
write: "With few general officers or staff officers, everything
had to be extemporized. Unprepared in every sense for war, we went
about our job with a cheerfulness and zeal born of our own vast
Ignorance. Most of our efforts would have caused a modern commander
11
to go gray overnight and would have bred hysterics in our present
3highly-schooled staff .
"
In view of the desperate need for technical and staff
officers, it was not surprising that a mercurial lad like Private
Mitchell with his collegiate background would be quickly selected
as officer material. The swiftness of this development, however,
was breathtaking. After only seven days duty as a private soldier,
Billy was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Signal Corps,
making him the youngest commissioned officer in the Army at the time.
He served for some months amid the chaos of Camp Cuba Libre, then
was sent to Washington, D.C. to assist in the organization of newly
formed Signal units. He had not been long in the capital before
he had an opportunity to demonstrate that he was no ordinary
beardless "shavetail", but a young man capable of courageous,
decisive action and blessed with that rare gift, natural leadership?}
The battlefield in this instance was a saloon, the story amusing
but impressive.
Temporary barracks and tent-cities had blossomed in war-
time Washington and troops were being marshaled into them under
conditions of hectic confusion. Newly enlisted men milled about,
being moved hither and yon, separated from their records, unpaid
for months, bored and impatient. A company of such soldiers, pro-
ceeding through downtown Washington one hot afternoon, decided it
3
Friedel, Frank, The Splendid Little War , p. 36.
4
Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit . , p. 33.
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had had enough and hilariously invaded the kitchen and bar of the
American House. It was not long before a riot developed, and the
smashing of glass and furniture could be heard for blocks. The
civilian police were ill-equipped to handle this sort of situation,
and the young company officers had long since fled to the Area
Command headquarters to ask for help.
Young Lieutenant Mitchell happened to be at the command
post at the time and promptly volunteered to have a look at the
problem. After all, action was action, whether in Cuba or in
Washington. He took along a small detail of husky non-coms and
rattled off to the scene in a commandeered street-car. The American
House was a center of bedlam by the time he arrived. Sounds of
drunken singing, crashes of breaking bottles and the thud of falling
bodies rolled from the dim interior of the saloon, as gaping
civilians and wary police stood at a safe distance outside. Billy
leaped down from the trolley, unhooked his service revolver and
handed it to the sergeant at his side. He quickly posted the detail
outside the saloon door, and alone and unarmed he threw open the
swinging doors and strode in. In a stentorian voice that could be
heard across the street he bellowed "AttenSHUN!" There was a
sudden silence, and to the amazement of the onlookers the battered
rioters meekly staggered out into the sunlight, where the detail
took over and lined them up in ranks. Billy dismissed the street-car
and personally marched the groggy troops the four long miles back
to barracks. Once they were safely tucked away, he returned to
headquarters and reported to the captain.
13
"You're back sooner than I expected/' remarked the captain.
"All right, how many reinforcements will you need?"
"Reinforcements?" Billy snapped, with a twinkle in his eye.
"Your troops are back in barracks, Captain. I think they could
stand a little cleaning up. And it would help if you paid them."
5
And with that the new lieutenant stalked off to his billet.
This incident was cited years later by two of Mitchell's
biographers, Isaac Pon Levine and Billy's sister Ruth, as an early
portent of what this m~n was to be. Certainly there was nothing
in this little adventure to suggest an officer willing to seek
refuge in "the book", to delegate unpleasant or dangerous responsi-
bilities to subordinates, or to be unduly impressed by rank either
above or below his own. Here was a man willing to do things himself,
a man who appreciated the need for milita
.
discipline and who could
instill it. Yet he did not seek slavish discipline as an end
in itself.
An individualist at heart, Billy was certainly not attracted
to the military j.3rvice by any love of form, order or punctilio.
It was the war that drew him at first, with its attendant oppor-
tunity for self-fulfillment in action and for patriotic service
in the line of duty to his country. A natura 1 leader, he found
satisfaction in a line of work that provided the chance to deal
with men, to direct their operations and to assume the responsi-
bility for his own decisions. This ready assumption of responsi-
bility could not be expected to endear him to his superior officers
under all circumstances, but as a junior officer he found himself
frequently shouldering burdens appropriate to higher ranks.
5
Levine , Isaac D
.
,
Mitchell, Pioneer of Air Power , pp . 23-24
.
14
Generally speaking, as long as he was In the "working ranks" his
eagerness and aggressiveness was appreciated, and these qualities
gave impetus to his rise up the career ladder. Moreover, his
assignment to the Signal Corps gave Billy a tangible technical
specialty he could master and enjoy. From the beginning, then,
Billy Mitchell fell naturally into the caste of technical officers,
a self-confident specialist rather than a spit-and-polish advocate
of "the system".
Although the war in Cuba was of short duration, Billy
succeeded in getting into it for a brief period. He commanded
a Signal unit in the Santiago sector and got a first-hand look
at the muddy, filthy, stench-ridden front before hostilities
ground to a halt with General Toral's surrender. Re was involved
in no direct combat, but the challenge of improvisation under
battle conditions intrigued him. Appalled by the confusion and
inefficiency he saw on all sides, he set his mind to devising
solutions for the chronic battlefield chaos. The need for better
communications was obvious. The memory of this unwieldy, flounder-
ing army wallowing about, in Ignorance of the movements and
intentions of the enemy as well as of its own ancillary forces
remained with him and formed a backdrop for his own personal
drama in the next war eighteen years later.
* * * * * *
A beneficial side-effect of the Washington riot episode
was that it brought Billy Mitchell to the personal attention
of Brigadier General Adolphus W. Greely, a noted Arctic explorer
who was serving as Chief Signal Officer. Impressed by Billy's
15
nerve and ability, General Greely commended him personally, and
thus began a friendship which was to be long-lasting. Tears later,
one of Billy's last books to be published would be his biography
of Greely.
After cessation of hostilities in Cuba, Billy remained
on in command of his Signal company and gained valuable experience
in stringing communications wires through jungle areas. In the
execution of his work he was strictly on his own, solving problems
by ingenuity and nerve, whether the problems were technical or
those involving snakes, armed guerrillas or yellow fever. Through
it all, though, his chief desire was to be transferred to the
Philippines where the Aguinaldo Insurrection had just broken out.
Although his father, Senator Mitchell, refused to use political
influence to obtain such a transfer, he managed to inform General
Greely of the young man's ambitions. Greely had not forgotten
Billy. In fact, in June, 1899, he commented on one of Billy's
6
reports from Cuba:
...It is a very creditable report, and indicates that this
officer, despite his youth, is a man of ability, energy and
intelligence. I have seen few reports giving so much infor-
mation in clear-cut form on a technical subject of such
range
.
In August, 1899, the long-awaited orders came through, and
by November Billy was in the Philippines. By a quirk of coincidence
he found himself serving in the division commanded by his family's
old Milwaukee neighbor, General Arthur MacArthur, whose son
Douglas had just been appointed to the Military Academy.
6
Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit . ,p.47.
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The Signal Corps had learned Its lesson well from its
Cuban experience. In the Philippine Insurrection, according to
the New York Times , the Signal men "covered themselves with
glory . . . there was no condition of affairs of which the
officers at the front were aware, which he (the general) too
7
did not know." In one notable instance, Billy Mitchell volun-
tarily devised and led a project to connect General Henry W.
Lawton's command post with headquarters. This exploit required
putting together makeshift lines utilizing wires from old
Spanish wire-wound cannons, barbed wire and anything else that
could be found, stringing them through guerrilla-infested jungle
ground and powering them with makeshift batteries. Billy's
detail made the line work, and without the loss of a man. Later
Billy participated in the long pursuit of Aguinaldo. In a mid-
night raid with only fifteen men, Billy distinguished himself
by personally capturing Captain Mendoza, Aguinaldo* s adjutant.
Finally, it was the underground information net discovered and
exposed by Billy and his unit that eventually led to the capture
of the wily Aguinaldo himself. Billy pleaded to be allowed to
follow up this trail, but General MacArthur entrusted the job
instead to the old soldier of fortune, Colonel Frederick Funs ton.
Billy was becoming more and more aware of world events,
and his expressed views were decidedly imperialistic in tone.
"I think we'll have to turn in and lick the Cubans before long,"
he had written. "...They are no more capable of self-government
than a lot of ten-year old children. The only way to settle this
* New York Times, Sept. 12, 1899
17
thing Is to annex the whole outfit, fight them until they dare
8
fight no more. . . "
Of the Philippine operation Billy commented, "The U.S. is
trying to do a thing here in two years with 100,000 men that
another would do with 300,000 in twenty, and the U.S. will come
qpretty near doing it."
Regarding the Boer War in South Africa, he said he was
"pleased to see that England is getting the better of the Boers.'"
Viewing his own future in the light of world events, he
wrote to his mother, who was visiting Germany at the time:
I think there will be a big stick-up somewhere one of
these days, and not very far away and probably with the
very country in which you are now in (sic) - among others.
This makes me want to hold a commission in the regular
establishment. 10*******
His tour of duty in the Philippines completed, Billy
returned home "the long way round", via Japan, China, the Straits
Settlements, India, the Suez Canal, Egypt where he met his father,
Paris where he celebrated his twenty-first birthday, and finally
his new station at Fort Myer, across the Potomac from Washington.
A headquarters post like Fort Myer held no charms for the
adventure-loving young lieutenant. He soon found that General
Greely was deeply concerned about a wire-stringing project in
Alaska, which was making dismally slow progress. Alaska was an
8
Levine, Op.cit
. ,
p. 45.
Q
Ibid
. ,
p. 47.
10
Ibid
. ,
p. 56 (Cf : Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit . , p. 59.
)
appealing prospect to Billy, partly because of the stories he
bad heard about it from Colonel Funston, partly because it was
America's last frontier, and partly because of its significance
as a stepping-stone to Asia. At Billy's request, General Greely
sent him north on a field trip to look int* the problem. The
answers were not long in coming. What was wrong, Billy reported,
was that the construction people were attempting to do all their
work in the summer, when the pack horses could pull very little
through the soft ground. Instead, he proposed, they should forget
their traditional fear of the cold and do all their pack work,
setting out lines, supplies, food and forage, during the winter
months, leaving the summer for the digging of post holes and the
actual erection of the poles.
Coming as they did from a man with virtually no Arctic
experience, these proposals were radical in the extreme. When
Billy made them, however, he typically volunteered his own services
to do the job. Both his recommendation and his offer were accepted.
He was sent to Alaska under General Harold Randall's command, and
was entrusted with job of stringing the major portion of telegraph
wire across the Alaskan interior. This achievement turned out to
be Billy Mitchell's most spectacular pre-World War accomplishment.
In extreme contrast to his tropical experience, Mitchell
was working in temperatures as low as seventy below zero, pioneering
work in the Arctic winter that no one had ever tried before.
Improvising all the way, working with dog teams, mules, Indians,
prospectors and trappers, he pushed through and cached the needed
19
equipment from Eagle City to Valdez, down the tanana River, over
Thompson Pass, to complete the communications link through central
Alaska. General Greely had estimated that the job would take
three to four years. It was done in two. On June 7th, 1903 the
old general received a wire from the wilderness : "REPORT LINE
THROUGH ALASKA COMPLETED SIGNED WILLIAM MITCHELL." An electrical
communication line was open from Washington through to Nome on
the Bering Sea, and as Billy wrote: "We had broken the portal ...
which shut out the white man from the North ...America's last
frontier had been roped and hog-tied. 1,11 In spite of a gloriously
mixed metaphor, Billy's enthusiasm came through clearly.
Billy returned from Alaska a captain, but he was still
not to be buried in a sedentary peacetime army. As a Signal Corps
instructor at the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and
as a member of the Field Artillery Board at Fort Riley, Kansas, he
devised methods for carrying antenna wires aloft by kites to
achieve tremendous increase in communications range. In April, 1906,
the San Francisco earthquake and fire occurred and Billy was on
the spot within three days helping to restore communications, and
incidentally working again with his old friend, now General Funs ton.
Later in 1906 the Cuban rebellion broke out and Billy was back on
familiar ground as chief signal officer. Within a year he completely
reorganized and rebuilt the Cuban telegraph system and constructed
the first high-power wireless stations on the island. In 1909 he was
Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit . ,p. 174. (cf : Levine. Op.cit . ,p.69.
)
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sent again to the Philippines to carry out a confidential mission
locating Japanese outlying wireless stations. While in the Islands
be participated in rescue and restoration work at the tiuie of the
1910 eruption of the Taal volcano in Luzon. He returned to the
United States in 1911, served briefly on the Mexican border, and
was then assigned to Washington as Signal Officer on the War
Department General Staff. Only thirty-two years old, he was the
12
youngest officer ever to have been assigned to the general staff.
The first thirteen years of Billy Mitchell's career
represent his non-flying period, the years of preparation. He had
already stamped himself a most unusual officer, a man of action,
energy and imagination. His experience had been of a kind which
placed maximum reliance on his own individual ingenuity and courage,
and in such assignments he had acquitted himself handsomely.
There was a dash about the way he accomplished things and about
the way he reported them. In an era of colorful individualists,
explorers, soldiers of fortune, adventurers, Billy stood tall.
One difference was that he was always a soldier. Although abhorring
slavish worship of "t.^e book" or of established procedures, he was
still proud of his uniform, military to his fingertips and
devoutly patriotic. His sense of responsibility was deeply personal
and something he could not pass off to subordinates. His mastery of
his technical specialty was something at which he felt driven to
be outstanding. His was a mind and a body which could not rest.
It was at this juncture, in 1911, that William Mitchell
and the airplane crossed paths, an encounter destined to be a
fateful one.
12
Arnold, Op.cit
. ,
p . 38
.
CHAPTER II
BILLY MITCHELL AND WORLD WAR I (1912-1918)
f
Through the year 1911 Billy Mitchell's military specialty
had been communications, and by his Ingenuity and interest he had
helped considerably to advance its technical progress. Now he
became interested in something new - the infant science of aero-
nautics .
As a matter of interest, Billy's old commander and family
friend, General Greely, had played a significant role in the
birth of heavier-than-air aviation. In 1896 Greely had observed
the demonstration flight of the scale-model "aerodrome" built by
his friend Samuel Pierpont Langley. At the outbreak of the
Spanish-American War in 1898 Greely, as Chief Signal Officer,
was in charge of military aeronautics (manned and unmanned obser-
vation balloons). On May 25,1898, he addressed a letter to
Secretary of War Russell A. Alger recommending development of
Langley f s machine, and urging "the great importance of such a
machine for warfare and the great good that would result to the
world at large should the flying machine be made practicable."
The result was a special congressional allotment of fifty thousand
dollars for Langley *s further experimentation. Although Langley 's
efforts were not fully successful, his work and his prestige
lent encouragement to Wilbur and Orville Wright. 1
1
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fThere is no evidence that Billy Mitchell was aware of
this early interest in aviation on the part of General Greely,
a*
but he came to appreciate it later on, especially in view of the
apathy with which the Army and Navy later regarded the military
potential of aviation.
Billy began studying the problems of flight while he was
in Alaska. During the long Arctic nights he read a great deal on
Signal Corps subjects to prepare for the examinations for his
captaincy. Among these subjects aeronautics played an important
part, and Billy mastered the material on balloon-handling, gas
manufacture, and even some data on the glider experiments of the
Lilienthal brothers in Germany and of Octave Chanute in America.
All this was simply background knowledge, however, and during the
years between 1903 and 1911 Billy was busy in Cuba and the Philip-
pines while the Army at home was making its first tentative
ventures into the aeronautical field of heavier-than-air flight.
The Army's initial steps into aviation were cautious
indeed. In 1906, three years after the Wright Brothers' first
successful powered flight at Kill Devil Hill, Army balloonist
Lieutenant Frank P. Lahm persuaded his superiors to allow him
and three other officers to undergo flight training with the
Wrights. In 1907 the Signal Corps tentatively requested bids for
the construction of a "military aeroplane" capable of carrying
for one hour one passenger in addition to its pilot, of attaining
a speed of forty miles per hour for ten miles, of flying a total
distance of 125 miles, and of being "demountable", that is
capable of being transported in an army wagon.
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The Wrights supplied such an aircraft in 1908, the so-called
Wright "B" Pusher. The War Department had no appropriation to
cover its purchase, but President Theodore Roosevelt and his
Secretary of War , William Howard Taft, managed to dip into some
o
special presidential funds to pay for it. During the preliminary
tests of this machine, the first model crashed at Fort Myer,
Injuring Orville Wright and kill.ng its Army passenger, Lieutenant
Thomas Selfridge, who thus became the nation's first military
air casualty.
By 1911, when Captain Mitchell was assigned to the general
staff, the little Aviation Section of the Signal Corps was manned
by a handful of daredevil young officers from other branches of
the service,, They had volunteered to learn flying from the
American pioneers in aviation - the Wrights, Glenn Curtiss,
Arch Hoxey, Walter Brookins, Leonard Bonney and others. They
practiced at isolated little fields at Simms Station, near Dayton,
Ohio, at College Park, Maryland, at San Antonio, Texas and at
Newport News, Virginia. The public was intrigued by the spectacular
exploits and harrowing crashes, but the War Department was
decidedly cool toward what it considered expensive and dangerous
nonsense
.
Captain Mitchell, from his vantage point as Signal Officer
on the General Staff, did not consider aviation nonsense. He had
already become aware that other nations were developing aviation
into a military weapon. He visited Japan in 1912 and discovered
that that nation had fourteen military aircraft and was at least
2
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BS far along technically as the United States. In the Balkan Wars
of 1912, Bulgarian and Greek aviators were using aircraft as
weapons, providing the first recorded instances of air-to-air
3
rifle fire and aerial bombing. Germany was developing its
Zeppelin fleet into a formidable threat, and France had the
surprising total of 1200 military airplanes. At this very moment,
what with casualties, resignations and financial retrenchment, the
United States Army had exactly two airplanes and two fully qualified
4
pilots, Lieutenants Thomas Milling and Henry Har ley Arnold.
Despite the pitiably small size of the American air
establishment, interest was stirring in Congress as to how this
new development might best be integrated into the military stricture.
With surprising but premature foresight, the House Committee on
Military Affairs considered the feasibility of setting up an
5independent air arm. Brigadier General George P. Scriven, Chief
Signal Officer, and all the other officers called as witnesses
disapproved of the proposal, with the sole exception of Captain
Paul Beck. At this time Billy Mitchell concurred in the general
view, feeling that the time was not yet ripe for an independent
experimental service, although he was heartily in favor of central-
ized control of aviation. In this, his first appearance before a
3
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Congressional committee, although his testimony was most thorough
it was also exhaustingly long-winded. To the discomfiture of his
listeners he talked for hours without interruption. This scene
was to be repeated in later years. Billy had a definite tendency
to get carried away by his subject, and when he did, time meant
6
absolutely nothing!
The issue of centralized control of Uie armed forces began
to loom large in Billy's mind about this time. It was a theme which,
in the words of Billy's biographer Isaac Don Levine, "was destined
to run like a red thread through the entire future crusade of
Billy Mitchell." In a paper prepared for the Army War College in
July, 1915, he envisaged the possibility of an invasion of the
American coast "by hostile patrol vessels and aircraft". He urged
creation of a Council of National Defense to place "the whole
7
national defense brains . . . under one roof".
The European war which had been in progress since August,
1914, had given immense stimulus to the development of military
aviation in Europe, and Billy was quick to evaluate the airplane
as the weapon of the future. He determined immediately to take
flight instruction. Since he was a Major, a member of the General
Staff Corps, and thirty-six years of age, the War Department
refused to assign him to flying school. Undaunted, Billy proceeded
to learn "lying on his own time and at his own expense. He would
6
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leave Washington each Saturday night on the night boat to Newport
News, fly all day Sunday at the Glenn Curtiss Company and return
to Washington by the Sunday night boat. For four Sundays he flew
with his instructor, Walter Lees. After that he flew solo. He
wryly observed that one bad crackup taught him more about flying
than anything that happened in the air.
His flying training completed, Billy was appointed
Executive Officer of the Aviation Section, in which capacity he
undertook to vitalize this moribund activity. A number of young
pilots, having reached the marrying stage, had decided to request
relief from flying duty and to return to the less hazardous pursuits
of their original branches of the service. One of them, Henry H.
("Hap") Arnold, had been back with the Infantry for a little over
two years, when the impact of Billy's appointment reached him.
Later he recalled the circumstances
:
We were at sea aboard a San Francisco-bound transport in
the late winter of 1915-16 when I received a radiogram from the
Adjutant General as abrupt as my original invitation to flight
training had been. Would I volunteer for duty in the Aviation
Section? Or if so detailed would I object? Naturally, I sent
back a reply asking what that meant. Immediately I received
another message: "If you apply for detail in the Aviation Section,
Signal Corps, you will come in with the rank of Captain. If not,
you will be detailed and will come in with the rank of First
Lieutenant." I knew at once that my old friend Billy Mit hell
was on the job in Washington. &
Billy started building up the Aviation Section's personnel
strength, but he ran into hard going when it came to obtaining
equipment. He was under no illusions that America would be able to
stay out of the war, Wilson's campaign slogan of 1916 to the contrary
8
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notwithstanding. With the cooperation of iiepresentative James Hay
of Virginia, Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, and
with the active support of the Aero Club of America, Billy secured
the first substantial appropriation for aviation, a sum of thirteen
million dollars. Events took an unexpected turn when the Aero Club
recommended that nine million dollars of the total be spent by the
National Guard on developing air units. Mitchell opposed this
suggestion bitterly, insisting that no group should be allowed
to hamstring the Army in tlw disposition ci its funds. One of his
public remarks at this time was reported as: "To hell with the
National Guard - it will never amount to anything?"
This remark was cited in a bill of complaints submitted
by the Aero Club to Secretary of War Newton 0. Baker. The Secre-
tary's investigation and report completely exonerated Billy, but
it was notable that this was merely the first occasion on which
Baker had to become involved in Billy's public controversies.
The public feud, moreover, had not endeared Billy to Washington
officialdom, and an early opportunity was sought to send this
outspoken young officer to some more remote place. The opportunity
was not long in coming.
Whe i the United States severed diplomatic relations with
Germany on February 2nd, 1917, Billy knew that war was not far off.
He requested an assignment from the War Department to go to
Europe as an observer, and it would appear that the War iuepax tment
was more than willing to grant his request. He arrived in Spain
on ajarc^ 29th, and as he crossed into France the United States
declared war.
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The details of Billy Mitchell's exploits in World War I
could fill many books. Most remarkable, however, was his achieve-
ment in assuming de facto command of American air operations
almost immediately upon his arrival in Paris. He sought official
sanction for setting up an air branch of the military mission in
the French capital, but got no reply from Washington. With no
further ado, using his own funds and those of friends, he pro-
ceeded to set up an American air organization. Believing firmly
in the value of direct experience, he overrode the protests of
the French staff and spent ten days in the front-line trenches,
then became the first American in the United States service to
fly over the front lines in battle. He visited Rheims during a
heavy artillery bombardment, underwent his first air-raid in
Chalons-sur-Marne, and received his first wound. He visited
Marshal Henri Petain, conferred with British Air Marshal Hugh
Trenchard and flew with the Royal Flying Corps, examined captured
German equipment, studied French and German methods and tactics,
and was awarded his first Croix de Guerre - all this within a
few weeks of his arrival. Meanwhile he bombarded Washington with
a ceaseless flow of recommendations on every subject from bombs
and parachutes to aerial photography and night combat. He selected
three of the most tried and tested European aircraft typ<-s and
engines and recommended their immediate production in the United
States, with concurrent development efforts toward production of
superior American designs. To cover the interim period of construc-
tion of factories in America, he urged the despatch of American
mechanics and materials to France to ircrease French output.
20
Receiving no answer on any subject from Washington, Billy
sat down with t.ie French General Headquarters staff and helped
draw up recommendations that resulted in a real bombshell -
a cablegram of May 24th, 1917 from Premier Alexandre Ribot to
President Woodrow Wilson demanding production of 16,500 planes
and 30,000 engines during the first six months of 1918. This
message xctually launched America's great aviation program, and
Billy's role in it was not fully appreciated until some time later.
In his diary in May, 1917 he remarked laconically , "I decided it
will be a good thing to get the French Government to exert
pressure on ours .
"
Having thus indirectly prodded American production, Billy
entertained sanguine hopes for the future, in which he was to be
bitterly disappointed. Aircraft procurement and supply was a sore
subject between Billy and his superiors throughout the war. That
the program got off to a slow start and bogged down badly was
certainly not Billy's fault. On the other hand, he could only see
the problem through the eyes of the combat flyers, who were
desperately tired of waiting for the promised thousands of airplanes.
Billy rightly blamed the slowdown on governmental inefficiency and
lack of qualified central direction. What he failed to take into
account was the fact that an immense industry could not be created
overnight. The appropriations of over one and one-half billion
dollars simply saturated the infant industry and resulted in
considerable wheel-spinning before real production got under way.
9
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Statistics covering this period can be deceptive. The
most reliable figures, taken directly from the Army Air Service
inventory (see Table I.) show a total of 11,754 American-built
aircraft accepted by the Army up until the Armistice and 2,317
afterward. Of this total, however, only 5,443 were combat craft.
Further, only 1,442 airplanes reached France before the Armistice,
and of these a mere 196, ready for use, reached the combat
squadrons. Obviously, as far as American industry's impact on the
air war was concerned, the mountain had labored and brought forth
a mouse. American air units in combat were equipped exclusively
with European aircraft, purchased for the American Expeditionary
Force (A.E.F.) from the Allied governments during 1917 and 1918.
The only American-built aircraft to reach the front were British-
designed DeHavilland DH-4's manufactured under international
agreement, so that not one truly American airplane fought in
World War I. Convinced as he was that the United States was the
birthplace of the airplane, Billy Mitchell found this circumstance
particularly galling, and the memory of it colored his attitudes
for years to come. On the Fourth of July, 1917, this plaintive
note was entered in his diary: "Our air force consists of one
Nieuport plane which I use myself, and that is all."10
10
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TABLE 1
AMERICAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION 1917-1918
.
Total Aircraft Accepted: to Nov. 11, 1918 -11,754
after Nov. 11, 1918 - 2,317
Total 14;
m
Major Items Produced: Curtlss JN-4 trainers 5,035
Curtiss JN-6 trainers 1,035
DeBavilland DH-4 (see note) 4,846
Standard SJ-1 trainers 2,001
Thomas Morse S4 combat 597
(Note: DH-4's manufactured by Dayton-Wright Co. - 3,106
Fisher Body Co. - 1,600
Standard Acft.Co. - 140
AMERICAN-BUILT AIRCRAFT IN FRANCE BY NOV.llrlBlS .
DeHavilland DH-4 - 1,440
Pachard-LePere LUSAC-11 - 2
Total 1,442
Plus parts for 100 Handley-Page bombers, sent to England.
EUROPEAN-PROCURED AIRCRAFT FOR THE A.E.F. - 1917-1918.
French Aircraft - 4,881
British Aircraft - 258
Italian Aircraft - 19
Total 5,158
aircraft: French - Breguet 14 376
Caudron 202
Nieuport 861
Salmson 705
Sopwlth 1 514
SPAD 1,124
British- Sopwith Camel - 143
Italian- S.I. A. (Fiat) - 19
(Data from U.S. Army Aircraft 1908-1945
,
compiled by James Fahey
from the records of the Air Materiel Command. Published by the
Aviation Publishing Company, New York, 1945)
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Not only was the aircraft production program stumbling,
but as so often happens in times of national crisis, it was
accompanied by wildly unrealistic propaganda. Figures of 12,000
and 20,000 aircraft per six-month period were airily promised by
War Department spokesmen in testimony before Congressional
committees, and forecasts of 100,000 aircraft at the front were
11
noised in the press. An untoward result was that Germany
hastily increased its aircraft production, and the increase was
not matched by any corresponding improvement on the Allied side.
At a Congressional investigation hearing two years later Billy
Mitchell testified that "these bombastic reports were dangerous
things", and Eddie Rickenbacker alleged that the extravagant
advertising "was the worst thing in the world that we could
possibly have done". The procurement debacle was to provide
Billy Mitchell with much ammunition for his battles with higher
authority in the tears to come.
Not that he did not have such battles during the war.
While struggling to get an adequately manned and equipped air
organization in the field at the time of the great German attack
of March, 1915, Billy became engaged in a heated argument with his
top commander, General John J. Pershing. His diary noted that
there was much "pounding on the table with fists on both sides of
the argument." Pershing finally told Mitchell that if he did not
11
Levine, Op.cit
. ,
pp. 101-102.
12
Ibid.
,
p. 102.
33
stop trying to change the air organization he would send him
borne. Billy responded that in that case Pershing might well
follow him home. "Black Jack" laughed and the argument ended on
13
a friendly note.
Billy's military command status and personnel relationships
were continually involved in snarls. He hady1 as we have seen,
established himself as the unofficial leader of all American
aviation in Europe, but "without portfolio" as Hap Arnold puts it.
I\a£>
Nearly a year after Billy's arrival, the War Department got around
to sending an official chief of air service to France, the veteran
pilot Brigadier General Benjamin D. Foulois. Billy was placed in
command of the combat air units of the First Army Corps under
General Hunter Liggett. Although there had been areas of friction
between the two airmen, Foulois recommended in July that Billy
succeed him in his job as chief of aviation for Pershing's Army.
Foulois took charge of training and supply in the rear areas
.
Loath to place an airman in the top assignment, Pershing had
given the job of air chief of the A.E.F. to his old friend Major
General Mason M. Patrick, a non-flying officer from the Corps of
Engineers
.
Regardless of the technicalities of official orders, Billy
Mitchell was by all odds the most potent personality among the air
commanders. Throughout the war he remained an active flying hero.
In September, 1917, the War Department belatedly issued its
Special Order 226 awarding Billy the rating of "junior military
13
Levine, Op.cit . ,p. 108.
34
aviator" as of the preceding July. The following day he was
promoted to Colonel, but he never became a headquarters officer.
At the height of the period of tension preceding the long-awaited
German offensive on the Marne salient in July, 1918, Billy flew a
lone reconnaissance mission far into enemy territory and spotted
the ne^ly erected pontoon bridges on which the Germans were
preparing to cross the Marne. This intelligence made it possible
for Toch and Pershing to meet and contain the main attack.
Subsequently, Billy organised and personally led a full-scale
bombing attack on the German supply center at Fere-en-Tardenois
which opened Pershing's eyes to the potential of local air
superiority and also contributed substantially to the success
of the Chateau-Thierry operation, a major turning point of the
war in 1918.
The Fere-en-Tardenois operation was the first large-scale
coordinated air offensive launched in the war. In September
Billy had the opportunity to develop his ideas on a much more
extensive scale. When the American attack on the St. . Mihiel salient
was being planned, he persuaded Foch and Pershing to let him
amass the greatest air strike force ever assembled and prepare a
massive blow coordinated with that of the ground armies. This
force totaled over 1,500 aircraft, in Americar, British, French,
Belgian, Italian and Portuguese units, all under Billy Mitchell's
command. The offensive, when launched, lasted four days, from the
12th to the 16th of September , 1918. Air superiority was retained
throughout the entire offensive and not one bomber was lost to
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enemy action. Over three thousand sorties were flown, seventy-five
tons of high explosive dropped, and sixty enemy planes destroyed,
all in spite of unfavorable weather. The first application of the
tactical air theory of "isolation of the battlefield", this
operation contributed heavily to the success of the St.Mihiel
campaign and the entire Meuse-Argonne offensive.
Praise came in from all quarters after the St.Mihiel strike.
General Pershing sent the following formal letter to Mitchell:
Please accept my sincere congratulations on the successful
and very important part taken by the Air Forces under your
command in the first offensive of the First American Army. The
organization and control of the tremendous concentration of
Air Forces, including American, French, British and Italian
units, which has enabled the Air Service of the First Army to
carry out successfully its dangerous and important mission,
is as fine a tribute to you personally as is the courage and
nerve shown by your officers a signal proof of the high
morale which permeates the service under your command.
Please convey to your command my heartfelt appreciation
of their work. I am proud of you all. 14
Marshal Hugh Trenchard of the Royal Flying Corps reported
to Pershing that of all the air operations in his experience this
was the first in which no unforeseen difficulty had occurred, no
order had been misunderstood and no mission had failed. Trenchard
enthused further, calling the operation "the greatest thing of its
kind ever seen in the war . . . the first example of massed air
15
striking power ever seen."
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On the 13th of October orders came through promoting
Billy to the rark of Brigadier General. He continued developing
the techniques of air-ground cooperation to a point that would
not be attained again until the days of the German blitzkrieg of
1939-40. Elated by the success of the St.lfihiel operation, he
began plans for an even more ambitious project, years ahead in
its conception. He proposed a more intense bombing concentration
on the Metz front, to be accompanied by the dropping of parachute
troops behind the German lines . Pershing gave his tacit consent
to this project, but the war ended before it became necessary.
Here was the genesis of the idea of parachute troops, an idea
which lay dormant for fourteen years before the Soviets startled
the world with it in 1932. A generation was to pass before the
massive German airborne invasion of Crete, a generation during
which the United States Army gave no thought whatever to the
development of parachute troops. In retrospect, it is difficult
to visualize how Billy Mitchell could have accomplished such a
feat at Metz in 1918, considering the types of aircraft he had at
his disposal, but he was famous for delivering what he promised,
so the feasibility of this project cannot be shrugged off, nc
natter how visionary it might appear.
Long before the end of the war Billy had become a
familiar and beloved figure to the French. Always flamboyant,
in his sporty uniform and scarf, he drove everywhere at breakneck
speed in a Mercedes racing car purported to be the fastest in
Europe. He had an elan that the French found delightful.
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Arriving at a time when their spirits were at a low ebb, he had
helped restore a certain vitality to their war effort. They called
bira "Notre General Americain" and cheered him as he roared along
the roads. France had many heroic pilots and America had brought
more, like Eddie Rickonbacker , Frank Luke and Raoul Lufbery, but
Billy Mitchell was something more. For he, more than anyone else,
had organized air power into a war-winning weapon, and with it had
secured important military victories. For the first time, it
seemed, the individual flying aces had a leader who was cast in
the heroic mold.
Billy rounded out his tour in Europe on a typical note,
with characteristic disregard for protocol. Stationed briefly at
Koblenz, he was visited by the Prince of Wales. When the Prince
Indicated a desire to fly, Billy promptly took him up in his two-
seater SPAD and the two had an exuberant sight-seeing flight up
and down the Rhine valley while diplomats and generals alike
shuddered. Before he left Europe, Billy was invited to Buckingham
Palace where he was personally thanked by King George V for the
kindness shown the Prince. Billy brashly took the opportunity to
suggest that the Prince should visit the United States. Whether
due to this suggestion or not, the Prince did make such a visit,
with considerable success.
With the war at an end, what was to be done with Billy
Mitchell? His superiors recognized his talents but deplored
his unorthodox approach. Plainly he had earned a high position,
but Washington recognized a bull in a china shop when it saw one.
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Although there was some agitation in the press and by air power
enthusiasts for his appointment as Chief of the Air Service,
no one who really knew him was surprised that he was denied the
top post. Instead, an old cavalryman and division commander,
Major General Charles T. Menoher, was unaccountably chosen to
head the Army Air Service. In January , 1919, Billy returned from
Europe as troop commander on the transport "Aquitania" and was
appointed Menoher's assistant.
CHAPTER III
WHAT WAS BILLY MITCHELL FIGHTING FOR ? (1919-1920)
War Department Special Order 52, dated 3 March, 1919,
announced the appointment of temporary Brigadier General William
Mitchell to the post of Assistant Director of Military Aeronautics,
relieving Colonel Archie Miller (later to be killed in a crash
under dramatic circumstances). One week later War Department
Special Order 57-0 further appointed Mitchell Director of
Military Aeronautics, replacing Brigadier General William A.Kenly,
retired. With the readjustments and reorganizations attendant upon
the end of hostilities, it was not until July 16th, 1919, that
Billy was officially named Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service
with the rank of Brigadier General in the Regular Army. It was in
this position that his role as the stormy petrel of the armed
forces was to begin.
Up to this point Mitchell had bean learning by experience
what air power could do. He was farslghted enough to see beyond
the limitations of the flimsy machines and inadequately trained
personnel of World War I. But he was impatient too. Now that he
found himself, as he thought, in a position to determine policy,
he was eager to get started and to accelerate progress. More
clearly, probably, than any other officer of his day, he saw the
immense changes that the advent of the airplane had brought to the
theories of war. It would be well at this point to review the
39
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status of air power at the close of World War I, in order better
to understand Billy Mitchell's goals and to be better acquainted
with the cast of characters in the drama of 1919-1925.
It is characteristic of the military forces that their
organizational structure tends to solidify. By a sort of military
corollary to Parkinson's Law, an organizational chart, once drawn
up, tends to perpetuate itself and stubbornly resists change.
Traditions, insignia, ceremonial and custom grow like ivy ( or
barnacles) on the framework of established institutions and
continue to flourish even after the institutions have outlived
their usefulness. The glory of the English longbowmen caused
them to be retained for a hundred years after the introduction of
cannon, until they were blasted from the field of Formigny in 1450.
The "Thin Red Line", the U. S. Cavalry , the plumed helmet, the
saber, all became such deeply embedded military traditions that
even when they could no longer possibly be utilized as combat
elements, they were cherished on the ceremonial level.
Conversely, when a new weapon or tactic emerges it is
frequently resisted as incompatible with what is already estab-
lished. When it can no longer be ignored, it is generally incorpo-
rated into the existing structure, whether or not the organizational
niche found for it is appropriate to its proper development. Thus
we saw the ludicrous controversy of the post-World War II era
over whether the ballistic missile properly belonged to the Air
Force, the Navy or the Army Artillery.
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The end of World War I found the ordered pattern of
military thinking disturbed by the emergence of a new weapon, the
airplane. Military doctrine had not been fundamentally changed
since the invention and application of gunpowder. Hardware had
teen vastly improved, but the Infantry was still Queen of Battles
and the capital ship still controlled the seas. The task of the
army was to close with the enemy's army on the field of battle
and to destroy it, then to occupy the enemy's land and seize his
capital. The task of the navy was to destroy the enemy's naval
forces, then his shipping, then to blockade his ports and starve
him into submission. In the past a few geniuses like Napoleon
Bonaparte or "Stonewall" Jackson had employed their tools with
rare perception and finesse, but the rules were the same. World
War I had seen no Napoleons or Jacksons and the war had been for
the most part a stalemate. The defensive armament of both sides
seemed invincible, and it was just a matter of seeing which could
hold out the longest. It was a ghastly endurance contest, a
blood-letting of incredible magnitude, a war fought to a conclusion
of sorts with little skill or imagination.
Not entirely without imagination, though. To the land
warfare a new ingredient had been added, on a very small scale.
High above the field of battle, little snarling machines were
penetrating behind the lines, delivering their stings in the
unprotected rear, potentially exposing the so-called "Zone of
the Interior" to the danger of bombs and bullets. After his first
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few sorties in the battle zone in 1917, Billy Mitchell wrote in
his diary: "A very significant thing to me was that we could
cross the lines of these contending armies in a few minutes, ...
whereas the armies have been locked in the struggle, immovable,
powerless to advance, for three years." 1
Billy saw readily that a new dimension had been added to
warfare, and the corollaries loomed large and explosive. The
lessons of the European battlefields held clear warnings for
the future security of the far-off United ;,ates. They developed
essentially along these lines
:
(a) The airplane was not in itself a weapon, but a carrier of
weapons. As such it was highly versatile.
(b) Operating in a third dimension, the airplane was independent
of the surface forces, and it should no longer be regarded as
merely an auxiliary to those forces.
(c) The ground armies and navies could protect their nations
only against other ground armies and navies, not against aviation.
(d) The existing limitations of aircraft as to size, speed,
altitude, range and load were technological only, and would rapidly
be erased.
(e) No conceivable barrier or defense, natutal or man-made,
could prevent the penetration of the in-erior of a country by
air forces.
(f) While surface forces hacked at the perimeter of a nation's
defenses, air power could strike at the enemy's heart - his
1
Mitchell Papers , Container 28, Library of Congress.
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industries, his communications, his ability to sustain a war.
(g) Just as the English Channel was no longer a barrier to
German air attacks, neither would the oceans long be ramparts
protecting the United States.
(h) The only effective defense against air power was air power
itself.
(i) Three-dimensional war called for unified direction, by a
single department of national defense.
MIf a nation ambitious for universal conquest gets off to
a flying start in a war of the future," wrote Billy Mitchell in
1919, "it may be able to control the whole world more easily than
2
a nation has controlled a continent in the past."
These lessons added up to a theory of war which Billy
developed in exhaustive detail during the immediate post-war
years. They are virtually identical to the tenets of the "Air
Doctrine" published by the Italian General Giulio Douhet in 1933
- not surprisingly, since Douhet was an admirer of Mitchell and
freely acknowledged his debt to the American. The same theories
were expounded in dramatic form by Major Alexander P. deSeversky
in 1941 in his best-selling book "Victory Through Air Power".
Seversky, too, acknowledged Billy to be "the clearsighted and
farsighted apostle of true air power" and "the human symbol of
3America's air age."
3
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deSeversky, Alexander P., Victory through Air Power ,
dedication page.
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What, then, was the actual structure of America's air arm
at the time Billy started his crusade? As we have seen, the very
first aeronautical venture - the observation balloon - had been
placed under the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps and had under-
gone experimentation as early as the Civil War. Carrying observers
aloft was originally conceived as extending the "eyes" of the
artillery, and was therefore entrusted to the service concerned
wit'i communications. With the advent of heavier-than-air aircraft,
the so-called Aeronautical Section of the Signal Corps seemed, in
military logic, the place to put this new device. Therefore, from
1908 until 1918 American military aviation existed as a small
sub-section of a technical service, on a comparable organizational
level with the carrier pigeons and the field telephone units.
Thus was evidenced no interest whatever in the development of true
combat aviation - a condition wheah might have been understandable
during the pre-war years, but which was difficult to justify once
World War I was in progress. Yet not until the United States had
been at war for a year was the air arm finally taken out from
under the Signal Corps and dignified by being constituted a branch
in its own right.
The U.S. Army Air Service, as it was designated, came into
being in April, 1918, as a new branch of the Army. Its members
discarded the crossed-flags insignia of the Signal Corps and
donned the new propellor-and-wing device of the Air Service. The
oew component acquired its own Chief of Service, Brigadier General
William A. Kenly. It also gained its own rather limited procurement
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authority. Organizationally this put the air arm on a level
equal to the other technical services such as Signal, Chemical
Warfare, Ordnance, or the Quartermaster Corps, but inferior to
the combat arms, i.e. the Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery or Corps
of Engineers. Due to its newness and small size, the Air Service
was treated as something of a stepchild. The cautious General
Foulois, not given to rash statements, complained in 1919 that
the air arm had "less dignity and a lower status than that
accorded the Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps or Army NUrse Corps!"*
Further, although an administrative organization was provided
for the Air Service, no operational structure was conceived.
Therefore Billy Mitchell had been obliged to improvise in France.
In fact, there is no evidence of any official orders from
?/ashlngton assigning Billy to any headquarters or unit other than
i.E.F. Headquarters until the 28th of May, 1918.
Operationally, military aviation was assigned organically
to the ground Armies and Army Corps, and air units were under the
direct command of the Army or Corps Commander to whom they were
attached. Thus air units would only be detailed missions calculated
to further the objective of the local ground army. Even the large
massed strikes on Fere-en-Tardenois and St.Mihiel, under Billy
Mitchell's command, were one-time operations in support of
major ground army offensives.
4
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The concept of command of flying activities by flying
officers was unheard of. Only a West Pointer who had progressed
through the service schools and the War College could be assigned
to the post of Chief of a Service. Consequently the air arm was
headed in turn by General Kenly of the Signal Corps, General
Menoher of the Cavalry and General Patrick of the Engineers.
In fact it was not until 1926 that a flying officer, Major
General James Fechet, was appointed to head the Army's air
component. Air command was a theme that Billy Mitchell dwelt on
again and again. He realized very early that the psychology as
well as the methodology of the airman and the ground soldier were
vastly different. In a lecture (undated) prepared for delivery to
the Command and General Staff School he stated:
The psychology of the old ground armies, continued from
time immemorial, is based on the psychology of the excited
mob where the average man, either uneducated or untaught or
forgetting all the higher elements in our civilisation, throws
himself savagely on his fellows. This is where the discipline of
ground armies must be exerled. Physical brute force of the one
must be exerted against the other. This is correct and just,
in its proper place.
On the other hand, the psychology behind our aeronautics,
which is based on the action of the individual far removed
from his comrades, thousands of feet in the air and hundreds
of miles from his frontier or coastline, a complete national
unit in himself, his actions and conduct governed entirely by
his mind, is an entirely different matter. The pilot in the
air is maintained and supported by other men on the ground
equally as important. These are airmen, not soldiers -
mechanics from the factories and workshops, educated up to
their duties and impelled that theirs is a new development
in a decisive element.
This is one of the reasons why it has always been impossible
to make air forces a part of ground armies - the psychology
is absolutely and entirely different... 5
Mitchell Papers, Container 22, Library of Congress.
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Here, obviously, the technician is talking. Billy saw
the air arm as essentially a force of technicians rather than a
mass of troops. Organization and administration he regarded merely
as necessary evils, which had to come second to operational
considerations. How well his trenchant prose must have endeared
him to his regulation-minded contemporaries may well be judged
from a paper he prepared in 1922 on the subject: "The Making of
Air Force Personnel".
Airplanes (he wrote) are not merely a means of trans-
portation, they are fighting units. Air forces fight in line
against other air forces. They use their own tactics, and
nave a highly specialized method of maneuvering in three
dimensions. The air man's psychology of war depends on the
action of the individual, he has no man at his elbow to
support him, no officers in front to lead him, and no file
closer behind him to shoot him if he runs away as in the
case of a ground army ....
To cover up their ignorance in these matters, these
older ground officers have always hedged back to the fact
that administration was the main thing in the conduct of
air forces. Administration is merely the orderly conduct of
correspondence in affairs. It has nothing to do with the
actual handling or leading of fighting forces. It is merely
a necessary nuisance. The best administrators usually are
the old sergeants or clerks that have been long in the service.
An excellent administrator could be obtained and hired for
certain fixed wages in civilian life. An airman cannot be. 6
The subordination of army aviation to the ground commanders
was a situation parallelled in the Navy. The naval air arm was
distinctly a subsidiary of the surface fleet. As far as Billy was
concerned, America really had no air power as such, but merely two
separate and distinct aviation auxiliaries of the surface forces.
Moreover, aside from the consideration of aviation, he was deeply
concerned over the division of command between the Army and Navy.
6
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Two distinct executive departments, each with its own Secretary,
aud with no unified command short of the President himself, Billy
regarded as sheer folly. As early as 1912 he had testified before
a Congressional committee urging establishment of a centralized
7department of national defense. This subject became almost an
obsession with him during the post-war years.
Others, also, were interested in im^ *oving the military
structure. In 1919 Benedict Crowell, the Assistant Secretary of
8
War, personally headed a board which went to Europe to study
the organization of the air forces of the various major nations.
Particular attention was devoted to the newly formed independent
itoyal Air Force of Great Britain. On returning to Washington,
the Crowell Board recommended a unified department of defense,
with co-equal army, navy and air forces, virtually the exact
organization Mitchell had been advocating. Admiral William S.
Benson, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , was so incensed at these
recommendations that he heatedly told board member Howard Coffin
that he was wasting his time. He was right. In the face of the
opposition of the Army-Navy Board and the apathy of Congress,
uothing was done. The Crowell Board's findings were quietly filed
away and not released to the press. Their general purport was
defiantly "leaked'' in December
,
1919, by the freshman Congressman
irom New York, Fiorello H. LaGuardia, who had been a combat pilot
in the war and had strong ideas on air power. The Crowell Board's
proposals thus died, stillborn.
7 supra
,
p. 25.
8
See Table 2.
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An amusing sidelight of the Crowell Board hearings
concerned the discontinuance of the wartime Naval Air arm.
Billy Mitchell, testifying bitterly on this subject, had pointed
out that naval aviation, a department in its own right during the
war, had been returned by Admiral Benson to the jurisdiction of
the surface agencies. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, was questioned on this matter on the
12th of September, 1919.
Mr . ROOSEVELT : Now of course that testimony shows that General
Mitchell knew absolutely nothing about the organization
of the Navy Department. That is example number one. On She
next page ....
Senator CHAMBERLAIN: Before proceeding further, will you state
wherein his analysis of the situation was wrong?
Mr . ROOSEVELT : ...No change has been made. General Mitchell
says that we have distributed these (aviation) duties
among six or seven departments. They were never (so
distributed) either in the beginning cr now. The Office
of Aviation comes under the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations ?
when later queried, Billy Mitchell had to direct the attention
of the board to a Navy inter-office order, OpAir 084-307 dated
1 August, 1919, (more than a month before the hearing), titled
"Discontinuance of Aviation Division". This directive closed out
the Aviation Division and assigned its various functions to seven
different sections, including the Bureau of Navigation and the
Office of Gunnery Exercises. The order was signed by Admiral Benson.
9
Extract from Congressional Record, 66th Congress, in the
Mitchell Papers
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Container 24, Library of Congress.
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MEMBERSHIP OF CERTAIN CONGRESdIONAL AND EXECUTIVE BOARDS
CITED IN THIS PAPER.
Executive Board on Air Force Organization - 23 August, 1919
(the "Crowell Board")
Hon. Benedict Crowell - Assistant Secretary of War (Chairman)
Howard h. Coffin - Member, Council of National Defense
(President-Hudson Motor Car Co.)
Captain, U.S. Navy
Colonel, U.S. Army Air Service
Lt. Colonel, General Staff Corps, USA
President-Wright-Martin Aircraft Co.
Vice-President, Curtiss Airplane Co.
General Manager, Manufacturers
Aircraft Assn.
Select Committee of Inquiry into the Operations of the U.S. Air Service
J.7 December, 1924 (the "juampert Committee")
Florian Lampert, Chairman
Albert H. Vestal
Rudolph Perkins (Rep. -N.J.)
Charles L. Faust
Frank R. Reid (Rep. -III.)
Anning S. Prall (Dem.-N.Y.)
Patrick B. O'Suliivan (Dem.-Conn.)
William N. Rogers
Special Board Making a Study of the Best Means of Developing and
Applying Aircraft in National Defense, Appointed by the President
30 September ,1925 (the "Morrow Board")
Dwight W. Morrow, Chairman
Judge Arthur C. Denison
Hon. William F. Durand
Senator Hiram Bingham - Utah
Hon. James S. Parker
Ron. Carl Vinson (D- Ga.)
Maj . Gen . James G. Harbord USA-Retired
Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher USN-Retired
Hon. Howard E. Coffin
Henry C. Mustin
Halsey Dunwoodey
James G. Blair Jr.
George H. Houston
Charles M. Keys
S.S. Bradley
(Data from the Mitchell Papers
,
Library of Congress
.
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The United States Navy was, in Billy's view, as backward
aad tradition-ridden as the ground army. The Navy's devotion to
the battleship as the "backbone of the fleet" was, he felt, just
as unrealistic as the Army's reliance on the foot-soldier. He
insisted that the airplane had rendered obsolete the large,
expensive and vulnerable battlewagon. Naval aviation had thus far
been limited to patrol and scouting functions, but Billy maintained
agaxu and again that no surface fleet could safely operate in an
area within reach of land-based bombardment units. A few farsighted
Navy men, notably Admirals William S. Sims and William F. Fullam,
privately agreed with him, but so potent a symbol of national
power as the battleship was not going to die easily. It was not
just a matter of the imposing appearance of the battleship with
its big guns. The vast naval shipyard establishmBBts, the naval
gun factories, the civilian steel industry, all constituted vested
interests deeply committed to the battlewagon. The ste*l lobby
and the legislators under its influence saw the controversy as a
matter of life and death. The "blue water admirals" had been brought
up in a tradition of capital ships, not flimsy aircraft, and
almost to a man they vowed battle to the death against this
upstart aviator. This particular battle, destined to be the most
colorful of all Billy Mitchell's campaigns, was not going to make
him popular with the military establishment.
The aviation industry was also involved in Billy's
crusade. Airplanes were his life, his consuming interest, and he
aever lost touch with the men who invented, designed and built them.
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Military needs could be met, he knew, only if the people who
used the planes maintained close contact with those who uade
them. He particularly encouraged imaginative inventors and
spent countless informal hours with them, going over the details
of all kinds of new devices. Here again, though, Billy was the
rebellious individual. By his devotion to the little men, the
dreamers and unsung geniuses, he became more and more alienated
fro-i the big aircraft industry that had burgeoned during the war.
He had reason for bitterness, as we have seen. The thousands of
aircraft he had been promised on the Western Front had come through
only a miserable trickle. His many recommendations had been
ignored, and Billy attributed much of the resistance to what he
called an unholy alliance between unscrupulous businessmen and
venal politicians. Others apparently felt the same way, for in
1919 a Congressional inquiry was initiated to investigate the
reasons for the failure of the multi-million dollar wartime
aircraft procurement program. President Wilson appointed his 1916
rival, Charles Evans Hughes, to head this inquiry. Reams of testimony
were taken. Billy Mitchell testified willingly and bitterly, but
all for naught. The Hughes Committee accomplished little. Not until
April, 1922 ras its final report issued, and by that time public
and Congressional interest had waned. In the report, Gutzon Borglum,
scilptor and engineer, who was the chief investigator for the
Committee, stated acidly, "There will be no convictions for this
gigantic fraud and we will get nothing but a political burial of a
10
crime of which Republicans and Democrats are equrlly guilty."
10
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Borglum obviously found more satisfaction working with stone than
with chicanery, as he went on to achieve fame as the sculptor of
the Mount Rushmore memorial.
During the war, the government had directed that all
aircraft patents be pooled, in order to facilitate rapid production
and sub-contracting of aircraft and engines. Sound in intent, this
directive worked drastically against the interests of the independent
inventors. Aviation was new, and many of the existing patents
had been secured by obscure pioneers who developed aircraft in
backyard hangars and small shops. When the patents were pooled,
the big organizations like Curtiss, Standard, and Dayton-Wright
profited by their application. The "little fellows" without
productive capacity lost out. Unaccountably, the patent-pooling
directive was not terminated after the war, which explains
partially why so few of the pioneer names in pre-war aviation in
America continued to be prominent after the war. Many of Billy
Mitchell's close friends were pioneers who had been financially
ruined by this arrangement. One of them, James V. Martin, claimed
11
to have lost the rights to more than fifty exclusive patents.
By taking up the cudgels for these men, Billy once again allied
himself with the "outer circle", and alienated whatever support
he might have had within the aircraft industry and its govern-
mental lobbies.
11
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Post-war Army aviation was dominated by the glut of
wartime-produced aircraft, principally the DeHavilland DH-4.
This airplane, of British design, had been produced in quantity
by three American manufacturers. Ten thousand had been ordered.
By 1919 almost five thousand had been built; the rest were cancelled.
Only 196 had reached the front in France before the Armistice.
The remainder were almost the sole aircraft with which the Air
Ser ice was to be equipped until 1926. The DH-4 was a mediocre
airplane, neither as good as its builders had hoped uoi j*s bad
as its detractors insisted. It simply existed in such numbers
that further progress was stymied. If the Air Service wanted
funds for development of new aircraft, it was told, in effect,
"You have plenty of aircraft!" As a result the Air Service
inventory through the early 1920 's was largely a tiresome array
of modifications of the DH-4, frcm the DH-4B to the DH-4M, adapted
for such tasks as night-flying, ambulance, crop-dusting or
photographic work. The last of these rebuilt planes rolled out
of the Boeing Airplane Company hangars in 1925.
The basic DH-4, as built by Dayton-Wright and the Fisher
Body Company, was a two-place biplane powered by a 400 horsepower
Liberty engine. Its top speed was 124 miles per hour, and it
served as a ground-attack, observation, or general utility aircraft.
It flew well enough, but it had had an unfortunate beginning,
which gave it a reputation it never outlived. In the original
design, unchanged until the period 1919-1923, the gas tank was
located in the center fuselage, between the fron and rear cockpits.
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FIGURE II.
DAYTON-WRIGHT AIRCRAFT CORPORATION DII-4
(the "Flaming Coffin")
Successive model designations applied to DH-4 aircraft:
DH-4 -Basic aircanft by Dayton-Wright, Fisher, and Standard.
DH-4A -Modified fuel system.
DH-4B -DH-4's with relocated fuel tank (see text) - 88 gal. tank.
DH-4Amb.l - One-litter ambulance configuration.
DH-4Amb.2 - Two-litter ambulance configuration.
DH-4B-1 -Enlarged main tank - 110 gal.
DH-4B-2 -76 gallon leak-proof main tank (A Mitchell suggestion)
PH-4B-3 -135 gallon main tank.
DH-4B-4 -Airways version - 110 gallon tank.
XDH-4B-5 Engineering Division experimental Airways version.
DH-4BD -Modified for crop-dusting.
DH-4BG -Smoke-screen laying configuration.
DH-4BK -Night-flying version. Navigation and landing lights.
DH-4BM -One-place transport-messenger.
DH-4BM1 -Transport with dual controls.
DH-4BP -Photographic - experimental installation.
DH-4BP1 -ktandaiu photographic configuration.
XDH-4BS -Supercharged Liberty engine
DH-4BT -Du'al-control training configuration.
DH-4BW -300 h.p. Wright H engine installed.
DH-4C -350 h.p. Packard 1A-1237 engine installed.
XDH-4L -Long-range version - 185 gallon main tank.
DH-4M
-Redesigned steel-tube fuselage.
Plus over forty other experimental configurations, undesignated.
(Data from U.S. Army Alrcraf t-1908-1945
,
previously cited)
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When the plane was hit by gunfire in combat, or when it crashed
on training flifhts, the fire from the tank gave the occupants
little chance of survival. As a result, the DH-4 quickly acquired
the sobriquet "Flaming Coffin". After the war 1,538 of these planes
were modified by contractors to the DH-4B model with the tank
relocated. In these the survivability increased considerably, but
Billy Mitchell never ceased referring to the plane as the "Flaming
Coffin" and blamed governmental disinterest for the many needless
deaths in DH-4 crashes. He maintained, too, that other better
designs could have been selected during the war, notably the
American-built Packard-lePere LUSAC-11, of which only thirty were
built and 995 cancelled after the Armistice.
Billy was always deeply concerned over the safety and
well-being of his air crews. During the war he had agitated
strongly for parachutes. After the war he managed to have them
adopted. He also personally took a hand in the development of
such forward-looking equipment as electrically-heated flying
suits and droppable fuel tanks as early as 1919. The scratching
for funds wos always the real problem, though, and Billy was
never silent in his quest for adequate appropriations. He wanted
to build up not only the security of the United States but also
the air industry itself - not for the sake of the industry but
to advance the state of aviation in general.
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES (1920-1921)
Billy Mitchell's campaign for the recognition of air
power led to a number of bitter controversies, but the most
spectacular by far was his project to prove the supremacy of
the airplane over the battleship. This phase started in 1920
and culminated in the "Battle of the Virginia Capes" in July, 1921.
Even Billy's most ardent detractors had to admit that this campaign
was carried througn superbly. The nation-wide publicicy that
surrounded it was certainly everything Billy could have wished.
Uf all Billy's accomplishments , this was the one whose fame
would be most lasting. However, there was about the whole thing
something of an element of Greek tragedy. This was the zenith of
the protagonist's fortunes - his moment of greatest triumph. But
it was a triumph that solidified the enmities of army and navy
officials against him to the point wnere they would not rest
until he had been silenced.
From the time he moved into nis Washington post, Billy
had been insisting that the battleship was obsolete - wonderful
for a fleet review but useless for a war of tne future. It was=,
he said, a mighty engine designed for surface warfare but helpless
against attack from above. It could not eluae or escape aerial
attack, nor could it withstand the lethal effect of aerial bombs,
which were more accurate and far more powerful than artillery shells.
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It was characteristic of Billy that he was not content with
merely trying to prove these points theoretically on paper;
he would far prefer to demonstrate them by an actual test in the
full glare of publicity. He had no fear of failure in such a test -
he was utterly convinced he was right.
An opportunity loomed in 1920, when the Navy undertook
bombing tests against the old pre-war battleship "Indiana".
Billy sought permission for Army aircraft to be exercised against
this target, but the Navy would have none of it. The only attacks
to be made would be Navy dive-bombing tests, after which the
target ship would be used for naval gunfire exercises. Secretary
of War Newton D. Baker saw no reason for the Army to become
involved in what appeared to him a purely Navy problem.
Here Billy was once again frustrated by the age-old
concept of the division of military responsibilities between two
agencies. According to established cxistom, the Army's responsibility
ended at the coastline, and this boundary was assumed to apply also
to Army aviation. The air-power advocates always maintained that
an airplane, as such, had no interest in what was under it or on
what kind of target its bombs were dropped. The fact that the
foot-soldier could not fight at sea or a warship operate on dry
land was no reason to limit the sphere of action of an air-borne
weapon which could operate anywhere. This logic was wasted on the
military authorities of the 1920 , s. As far as they were concerned,
the Navy could shell shore fortifications and the Coast Artillery
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could fire at ships but such v. as the maximum permissible overlap
of functions. In point of fact, this limitation was destined to
continue with little modification until the onset of World War tl*
In 1920, in spite of its glorification of the capital ship,
the Navy was becoming uneasy about the possible effect of aviation
on surface fleets. A tentative step in the direction of ship-based
aircraft had been made with the commissioning of the Navy's
first aircraft carrier, a small, slow, converted collier renamed
the U.S.S."Langley". Admirals Sims and Pullam were predicting that
air power would be the decisive weapon of the next war, but the
"battleship admirals'* considered such an idea heretical. The modern
capital ship of World War I certainly looked invulnerable to the
fragile stick-and-wire biplanes of that day. The admirals did
decide, however, to try out their new dive-bombing tactics against
the old "Indiana' 1 under controlled conditions. The results achieved
were unimpressive but vaguely disturbing. The dive-bombers were
limited to small bombs, none over two hundred pounds, and their
bombing accuracy was poor. Official observers reported with evident
satisfaction that the "Indiana" remained relatively undamaged even
though it had sustained a number of hits. Significantly, the
results of the tests were never released or published.
A possible reason for the Navy's reluctance to publicize
the results of the "Indiana" tests came within a few weeks. A
British naval journal printed unidentified photographs of a
1
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damaged battleship, which Billy Mitchell recognized as the
'jlndiaaa". After closely examining the pictures, he released
them to the American press, with an exhaustive analysis of the
apparent damage. It was true, said 3illy, that the battleship
was still afloat, but it had been rendered useless as a combat
vehicle. He pointed out that all electrical systems had been
destroyed or rendered inoperative, the guns and turrets were
out of action, the navigation bridge and engine-room telegraph
were gone, the lights and ventilation systems below decks #ere
out of commission, and the boilers themselves may well have been
ruptured. He noted further that the "Indiana" had had no fuel or
ammunition aboard, and that had the bombing been done against
an active armed ship the damage would therefore have been far
worse, since it appeared that the magazines had been penetrated.
Had a crew been aboard they would have sustained major casualties
to the point of being unable to man fire-fighting parties. He
scornfully refuted Naval attempts to dismiss the test as invalid
due to the age and obsoleteness of the vessel. The bombs used,
he reminded critics, were only one-fifth the size of those then
available to the Army Air Service. Moreover, the accuracy of
dive-bombing did not compare with that of horizontal bombing.
If the ship was obsolete, he maintained, so were the bombs and
tactics
.
Shrill controversy arose, although Billy heard sounds of
support coming from surprising quarters. The retired Admiral Sims
who had been Naval Commander-in-Chief in European waters during
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the war, spoke up in Mitchell's behalf, observing pointedly that
"the average man sutlers very severely from the pain of a new
2
idea." He urged the adoption of the aircraft carrier as the
capital ship of the future ratiier tnan the battleship. Admiral
Fuliam predicted that "sea power will be subordinated to or
dependent on air power."" Admiral cradle* Fiske, noted naval
inventor and ship designer, supported Mitchell's views. And from
England came a crusty and surprising comment from Admiral air
John fisher, "breadnaught Jack", the great pre-war exponent of
the big battleship, oiaid he, There is only one thing to do with
the ostriches who are spending these vast millions on what is as
useful ior the next war as bows and arrows, iiack the lot.'"4
in spite of these individual sentiments, Billy got no
support from his own service. Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels, irked by the whole controversy, appealed to War Secretary
Baker to silence and rebuke Mitchell for sowing discord between
5
the services. Baker readily did so. The "Indiana" story was
put back under wraps.
2
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Not one to be rebuffed easily, Billy now drew aim on
something bigger than the "Indiana'. Under the terms of the
Armistice, the Allies had been given a number of captured German
naval vessels to use for experimentation and evaluation until
July 31st, 1921 at the latest, by which time they were to be
scrapped or otherwise destroyed. The group assigned to the United
States included the submarine U-117, the destroyer G—102, the
cruiser "Frankfurt" and the heavy battleship "Gstfriesland".
The last was a veteran of the Cattle of Jutland, and was con-
sidered to embody the most advanced features of naval design.
Heavily armored and constructed with watertight bulkheads, it was
one of the first naval vessels to be regarded as "unsinkable".
The "Ostfricsland" had a triple-hulled construction as compared
to the double hull most battleships then employed. This would be
a tough target indeed, but the opportunity to exercise bombardment
aircraft against it was too good to pass up. Billy Mitchell now
devoted his most strenuous efforts toward arranging a bombing test
against these ships.
Optimist that he was, Billy thought helpful changes might
be ahead on the political scene. Though he was a Democratic Senator*
son, Billy never evidenced much interest in politics. He was
solely concerned with his field of aviation, and had a soldier's
apathy toward the political arena. In view of his family's
Democratic tradition, Billy intimated to friends that he privately
favored the Cox ticket in the 1920 election, but he did not feel
too strongly on the subject. The old Wilson administration had not
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done much for aviation, and after his experience with Franklia
Roosevelt in the Crowell Board hearings, he could not have been
too pleased at his selection as Cox r running mate. Either way it
would be a new regime, and Billy hoped for the best. As it turned
out, his hopes wore to some extent justified - the Harding cabinet
was at. first more inclined to listen to him. But Billy had not
planned on Calvin Coolidge.
Between January and March of 1921, the "lame duck" period
of the outgoing Wilson administration, Billy engaged in his last
tilt with the old team. Testifying before the House Appropriations
Committee, he pleaded for funds to build up an adequate air defense
for the United States. He insisted that air power was the only
realistic defense of the coasts, and pounded again on the theme
that aircraft could destroy any ship afloat before it could come
vithin threatening range of the coastline. His plea was earnest
and direct.
"All we want to do is to have you gentlemen watch us
attack a battleship ... All we want is a chance to demonstrate
these things and have you gentlemen see them * . . Give us the
warships to attack and come watch it ... We are prepared to give
6
you that demonstration now ... Tomorrow if you wish."
This was a bit of Billy's overstatement again, because
the Air 3ervice was anything but ready at the time. But he did
have the ring of conviction. Possibly because people were beginning
to listen, Secretary Daniels exploded into print with one last
blast. This whole proposal was ridiculous, he snorted. He offered
6
Levine, Op.cit.
,
p. 208.
64
to stand bareheaded on the bridge of any battleship while such a
bombing test was carried on, maintaining that any airplane would
be "blown to atoms" long before it could get close enough to
7
"drop salt on the tail of the Navy!"
The national press had a field day over this statement. The
Baltimore Uun taunted Daniels mercilessly: "It would thrill many a
heart to witness the duel that he proposes, with Daniels himself
at the ship's wheel. Even the cup races would pale by comparison
with a dispute to the death in which the Secretary of the Navy
8
wielded that awful engine of modern destruction, the warship."
The New York Tribune , on a more sober note, termed Daniels'
remarks "undignified and gratuitously offensive."®
Billy always insisted that he was not anti-Navy. He made
uo reported comment on Daniels' remarks. Moreover he told the
House Coinmittee he could understand the navymon's feelings. He
candidly told the committee members : "The trouble is that we do
aot like to see things destroyed that we have been brought up to
revere and protect; that is human nature and it is nobody's fault.
7
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The battleship is looked on ail over the world by all the navies
as being the thing that must be glorified. We think we can destroy
it; it is our business to attack it, and it is up to you to judge
whether we can do it or not. Give the air a chance to develop and
10
demonstrate what it can do J"
The Congressmen on the Appropriations Committee were
beginning to sound interested, an interest that both adminis-
trations finally came to sense. On February 7th, 1921 Secretary
Daniels indicated that the Navy desired to conduct tests on the
captured warships, and was willing to admit the Army to joint
participation if it wished. At the same time a resolution was
introduced in Congress, sponsored by two Mitchell backers,
Representative Daniel Anthony (R-Kan.) and Senator Harry New (R-Ind.)
directing the Secretary of the Navy to place certain warships
at the disposal of the Army Air Service for tests. The Navy was
alarmed. If there were to be tests, they must be run under Navy
supervision and control. The thought of the Army Air Service
conducting a test at sea against battleships was heresy. Before
the resolution could come to a vote, the War and Navy Departments
agreed to hold the proposed tests under the control of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. The agreement was
approved by Secretary of War Baker on Tebruary 2Sth, four days
before the expiration of his term of office. Billy Mitchell was
uot bemused by the prospect of strict Navy supervision, but he
was delighted that in one way or another he was to have his
crack at the warships.
10
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Billy's fortunes appeared briefly to be on the upturn in
other ways, too. On March 1st, President-elect Harding let it be
known, via inspired statements in the press, that he was in
favor of creating a unified Department of National Defense, and
that his prospective Secretaries of War and Navy, John W. Weeks
and Edwin Denby respectively, concurred in this view. It was
further intimated that the Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton
C. March, would resign and be replaced under the proposed
reorganization. Three weeks later Harding hedged on this
suggestion. However he did indicate that he was interested in
creation of a separate unified air service, and that his final
decision hinged largely on the outcome of the forthcoming bombing
tests, which he regarded as a test of the potentialities of air
11
power
.
Possibly the idea of the tests appealed to Harding's
sporting blood. Like most of the American press, he saw the
tests as a showdown for Billy Mitchell. In effect Billy had
been called to show his cards - it would soon be seen whether
or not he was bluffing. For Billy, then, the tests became a
natter of life and death for his Air Service. If they achieved
the success he hoped for, he might see the establishment of the
defense organization he had been fighting for ever since the
end of the war. He knew that the "battleship admirals " would
view this as a matter of life and death too, and that instead
of merely participating in a test he would be in the thick of
11
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the fight of his life. All the more reason to suspect the Navy
of trying to arrange the details and procedures to its advantage.
With mounting concern Billy watched the arrangements
being made. It was clear that the Navy was not going to make
things easy for him. The tests had been billed as "ordnance
evaluation exercises", whose purpose was to determine the
effectiveness of various types of ammunition. There was no
ostensible intent to make a maneuver or war problem out of the
exercise. Theoretically all Eilly had to do was prove that iiis
aerial projectiles and the Air Service's technique of delivery
were capable of sinking the ships in question. He knew that the
primitive aircraft and bombs available to him fell short of being
considered real war weapons, but even with these limitations he
felt he could do the job. That was, at least, until the Navy
began setting up the ground rule;?.
All previous bombing of targets had been done in the
sheltered waters of Chesapeake Bay, safely away from shore but
close to the Navy's Norfolk base and the Air Service's station
at Langley Field. For these tests, however, the Navy insisted
that the target ships be anchored in deep water a minimum of
seventy-five miles out to sea off Cape Charles, Virginia. By
today's standards this distance does not seem great, but in 1921
the majority of the Army's aircraft were single-engined DH-4's.
Even the heaviest Handley-Page bombers had only two 250 horse-
power engines. None had radios or reliable navigation equipment.
Not only were they ill-equipped and their crews xll-trained for
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overwater flying, but in actual fact they had been legally
prevented from 1 ecoming bo trained by the Army-Navy policy of
division of areas of responsibility. Flight instruments and
overwater emergency gear were as yet unheard of. Now all these
aircraft would have to fly more than a hundred miles over water
to the target area, accurately locate the target, bomb it, and
return over a hundred miles to Langley Field. Billy knew, too,
that fog and poor visibility might well be a problem. If the
naval observers could see the target ships from their surface
vessels they would expect the flyers to find them regardless
of visibility aloft. Any failure, Billy knew, would be a failure
for air power.
The ground rules turned out to be exteemely restrictive
as to the bombs used and the number of hits to be allowed,
particularly on the big target, the "Ostfriesland". As the Navy
well knew, the Army's heaviest bombs at this time were 1100 pounders.
The rules specified that the bombers were to be allowed only two
hits "with the heaviest bombs". Further, they specified that the
target Amps were to be destroyed by naval gunfire or demolition
teams in the expected event that they were not sunk by the a< rial
bombs
.
Faced with this challenge, Billy Mitchell waded into the
fray with characteristic imagination and thoroughness. The bomb
business was a matter of the first importance. With the help of
his personal friend, itojor General C.C.Williams, Chief of Ordnance,
he drove the aircraft armament division of the Ordnance Department
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to rush the development and construction of 2000-Ib. bombs,
which were "in the works" at the time. These were to be the
largest bombs in the world, and their development program was
telescoped from what would have been a whole year to only three
month3
.
Of course Billy needed aircraft that could carry these
huge new bombs. The half-dozen old experimental Martin bombers
that he had left over from the war were unusable for this, but
an order had been placed for twenty improved MB2 bombers, each
with two 420 horsepower engines. Again Billy applied the lash,
this time on the Air Service Engineering Division and on the
Glenn L. Martin Company, to expedite delivery of the new planes.
As it worked out, the planes were delivered to Langley Field in
12
July, just as the tests were starting!
Only highly trained personnel could succeed in these
exercises, and here Billy applied his major effort. He started
building his task force around the veteran Second Bombardment
Group at Langley Field, the oldest bombardment unit in the Air
Service. Into Langley, from ail over the country, he brought the
best crews he could find, then weeded them out until he had what
he considered the cream. The force he assembled was designated the
First l>rovisioaal Air Brigade and was composed of 150 bombardment
and pursuit aircraft and over 1000 personnel. Through the months
of April, May, and June this force worked as though it were at war.
Battleship outline targets were bombed under all conditions of
weather and visibility. Live bombs were used and scored by camera
12
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on the hulks of the old battleships "Indiana" and "Texas" half
submerged in the shallows off Tangier Island in Chesapeake Bay.
By constant practice, pilots became accustomed to flying over
water when the horizon was lost in mist and the surface was calm,
without becoming spatially disoriented. By the time July rolled
around, Billy's Provisional Brigade wus a finely-honed weapon,
ready to get the maximum out of its machines. In an echo of
World War I, Billy's enthusiasm was again mirrored in the high
morale of his troops.
During the preparation phase Billy .limself was always in
the thick of things, personally observing all bombing practice
from his little two-seater DH-4, the "Osprey". He frequently
took his sister Harriet along with him on these flights, and
from time to time would pass her notes, presumably commenting on
what was going on down below. Unfortunately the public will remain
ignorant of what was in these messages, because Harriet was usually
so busy hanging on and bracing herself that the notes blew away in
the slipstream. 13
Billy had a theory about the bombing of ships, which he
confided to his bombardiers although not to the Navy. Knowing the
power of underwater transmittal of shock (a phenomenon he remembered
from his childhood days when he would knock two stones together
under water and hear the sharp concussion), he theorized that an
underwater explosion close to a ship's side could be more deadly
14
than a direct hit. With this "water-hammer" effect in mind he had
13
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his flyers carefully rehearse bomb drops close to the sides of the
targets. He knew that such "aear-iaisses" would not be counted as
direct hits under the Navy ground rules, thus their effect would
be added to that of the two direct hits permitted. As it turned
out, this proved to be a valuable dividend to the bombers.
In retrospect it is easy to say that the proper perspective
was lost as far as these tests were concerned. Public interest
rivaled that exhibited in a "Acrid Series, and the competitive
aspect completely overshadowed the scientific. There was no
question, however, that the publicity Billy always sought had been
achieved, and he had a keenly interested nationwide audience.
If his .airplanes succeeded in sinking the battleship, or even if
they failed, the nation and the world would know. This would not be
a test whose results could be buried in departmental files. In an
analogy President Jarding would nave appreciated, Billy was not
afraid to show his cards.
On May 29th, just as the public appetite was being whetted
to a sharp edge and military nerves were getting sensitive, the
first of two untoward occurrences threatened the whole operation
and Mitchell's career as well. On this particular day the air was
prominent in the news. Captain Eddie iUckeubacker was on the last
leg of a record transcontinental flight, winging his way between
Washington and New York as the nation waited for news. Meanwhile
at iAngley Field a massive aerial review by the Provisional Brigade
had just been given in honor of a Captain deLavergne, the Frencn
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military attache. Late in the afternoon, as the visiting aircraft
were returning to Washington, a widespread and violent electrical
storm struck the area and caught several of the aircraft in flight,
with disastrous results.
Billy Mitchell was returning to Washington in a single-
seater Curtiss-built SE-5, leading two wing men, Captain William
Ocker in a DH-4B and Captain Stuart P. Wright in a Fokker. The
formation had a harrowing time getting through the storm but all
three landed safely at Washington. However a large tri-motored
Curtiss Eagle transport, flown by Lieutenant Stanley M. Ames
and Colonel Archie Miller (Billy's old predecessor in Washington)
and carrying five passengers, including two prominent civilians,
Mr. A. 3. Batchelder and Mr. Maurice Connolly, crashed near Indian
Head, Maryland. All aboard were Icilled, setting off a hue and cry
in the press and demands from Congress for an official investi-
gation. This demand was superfluous, as an investigation was
already under way. The inquiry did not reflect great competence
on the part of the pilot of the ill-fated aircraft, Lieutenant
Aiaes. In fact some of the testimony is amusing from the vantage-
point of the Ubu's. The French Captain deLavergne was questioned,
as he had ridden down to Laugiey in this same aircraft with Lt.Ames
as pilot. 7/ith Gallic discretion, he described the rather
terrible landing Lt. Ames had made at Langley.
"The pilot landed perfectly", testified deLavergne, "but
the plane did not land very well ...The pilot was certainly a
very good flyer, undoubtedly ..."
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"After landing, I did not see the pilot. I think he went
away. We found him only for the return trip. I don't know where
he went, but I am sure Colonel Archie Miller was not favorably
impressed. He was always shaking his head in the plane. We were
lost and we looked at the map. It took twenty minutes to get the
right direction, and it & Colonel Archie Miller who found the
right direction because the pilot had to watch the controls. He
15
had no time to look at a map ..."
More significantly, Lieutenant Delbert E. Jones, weather
officer at Langley, testified that he had uot been able to get a
v/eather report from Boiling Field (Washington) for two hours due to
the condition of the commercial telephone circuits. He had no
knowledge of the storm's direction. At this point the strident
voice of Billy Mitchell was heard, bitter J., blaming the crash on
the non-existence of radio aids and military weather advisory
services. He used the occasion once more to preach the need for an
independent, unified air department for greater efficiency and
safety. Mitchell' 3 partisans took up the cry and even agitated for
Mitchell's appointment as Chief of the Air Service. Billy's critics
denounced him for trying to use a tragedy to further his personal
anbitions. The extremists on both sides made the episode ridicu-
lous. In retrospect i. is clear that Billy was, as always, deeply
affected by disasters suffered by his fl.'ers and was quick to hurl
accusations of blame. At the time official tempers were on edge,
and Billy's superior, General Menoher, was furious, even before
the second incident, a trivial one, made the situation worse.
15
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During the big aerial review at Laugley on the 29th,
newsreel cameramen had been having a field day taking shots of
fleets of airplanes, piles of bombs and cheering airmen. When
their photos were published, prominent in one of them was a
large bomb on which some wag had scrawled in chalk: "Regards
to the Navy!" When Navy Secretary Denby and his admirals saw
this they roared in righteous indignation, and their combined
wrath was enough for the old cavalryman General Menoher. With
no further ado he penned a curt memorandum to the Secretary of War
"Major General Charles T. Menoher formally requests the
Secretary of War to remove Brigadier General William Mitchell
from office."
Coming as it did with nc advance warning, this little
bombshell put Weeks in an extremely awkward position. He shared
General Menoher *s uneasiness about the irrepressible Mitchell,
and he deplored the inter-service rivalry that was being fanned
continually by the press. However he knew this was not the time
to suggest getting rid of Mitchell. The public had cast Billy in
the role of David to the Navy's Goliath and was eagerly awaiting
the denouement of the conflict. For the Secretary of War to
relieve the challenger at this crucial point would be tantamount
to political suicide. For two na$h. Weeks agonised over the problem,
and left Menoher *s memo unanswered. Finally he decided to sample
public sentiment by sending up a trial balloon or two.
First, in an article in the New York World , he inserted
the gentle statement that "Mitchell has greatly annoyed the Navy
75
16
on several occasions." He noted no immediate reaction, but
the next day he was quoted in the New York Sun to the effect
that " all precedents of army discipline and service would
probably cause him to accede to the request of General Menohcr
17
to remove Mitchell."
This was the first intimation to the public that Mitchell's
removal was even a remote possibility, much less that Menober had
requested it, and the reaction was immediate and violently indig-
nant. A flood of telegrams from men's and women's clubs, aviation
and veteran's organizations and from aroused individuals poured
in on Congress and the Secretary's office. The press was highly
vocal. The New York Globe on the -ith of June praised "the courage,
energy and convictions of General Mitchell". The Times lauded him
as " a brilliant, active, positive, outspoken officer, quick to
18
;ake the initiative and assume responsibility." In the same
article the Times reported that "several Senators are threatening
to intervene in the controversy and are discussing the advisability
19
of airing the whole subject on the Senate floor."
This was quite enough for Secretary Weeks, who beat
hasty retreat and dumped the whole issue back on General Menoher's
lap. It was up to Menoher, he intimated, to control his fractious
subordinate. If this was beyond his capabilities he had better resign.
16
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Menoher withdrew his request for Billy*s removal, and further
announced that preparations for the tests would proceed as
planned.
The end result of these tempests in a teapot was, of
course, that more publicity had been achieved for the tests and
that their complexion became more than ever that of a personal
duel between Mitchell and the Navy. Billy knew that he was playing
for the highest stakes possible at this point and that his whole
career and the whole future of the Air Service would hinge on
the outcome of the contest.
On the 21st of June, 1921, the long-awaited bombing
tests got under way. Admiral Henry B. Wilson, Commander-in-Chief
of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), was in charge aboard his command
ship, the U. S. S. "Henderson", With him at various times were
dignitaries such as the service Secretaries, General Pershing,
Senators and Congressmen and distinguished foreign observers.
Billy Mitchell never set foot on the "Henderson" during the
entire operation. Instead he personally observed all the bombing
from his command airplane, the "Osprey". He was very much in
evidence throughout the tests, and all eyes were on him as he
circled the target area, occasionally making a low pass around
the command ship and waving to the onlookers.
In proper dramatic fashion the tests started with the
smallest target and worked up to the largest. The first was the
submarine 0-117. Naval seaplanes were to attack it with 163-lb.
bombs, after which the Army was to be called in if necessary.
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la this case the Army was not needed. After a total of twelve
bomb drops in sixteen minutes the U-117 upended and went to the
bottom. Many observers were shaken by the swiftness of the
sinking, but this was only the beginning.
The second act was not a true ordnance evaluation. In
this exercise the target was the old battleship "Iowa" operated
by remote control. Naval aircraft were to locate it and bomb it
with dummy ammunition. In this case the Navy's bombing accuracy
was quite poor, only two direct hits being scored out of eighty
bombs dropped. The betting odds now turned in favor of the
battleship, and the old Navy hands aboard the "Henderson" began
to breathe more easily.
In the third phase, on July 13th, Billy Mitchell's Ar.ny
flyers put in their first appearance. The target was the former
German destroyer G-102, and the attack was to simulate combat
conditions, although the armament was limited to 300-lb. bombs.
Mitchell first sent in a wave of pursuit planes which raked the
destroyer's decks with machine gun fire. For the coup de grace,
Billy had been saving a little surprise. With the flair of a
magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, he sent in a full
squadron of the new Martin bombers that had just arrived at
Langley two days before. The Martins made one bombing run,
dropped a salvo of forty-four bombs, and in only nineteen
minutes the G-102 went beneath the waves.
The fourth phase involved the light cruiser "Frankfurt",
a modern ship with low, sleek lines. The program called for ten
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alternating attacks by Army a: d Navy aviation, using no bombs
bigger than 600 pounds. The preliminary attacks dragged out
during the day, the smaller bombs doing relatively little
damage. By four o*clock the Navy started preparations to
finish off the target with shellfire, while over the horizon
lumbered six Handley-Page bombers with their 600-pounders . The
bombers dropped fourteen bombs, several exploding alongside the
hull and releasing their water-hammer effect. As the airplanes
wheeled toward shore, the "Frankfurt" began to settle in the
water. A few minutes later her stern rose high and she took the
final plunge, as Navy gunners called off their preparations.
Billy Mitchell commented later that he hated to sink this ship
20
because she looked so graceful there in the water, "like a swan."
The last target was the big one, the mighty "Ostfriesland".
Attacks started on the 20th of July and progressed with maddening
slowness. On the first day bombs were again limited to 600 pounders,
and the program was repeatedly delayed by boarding parties
Inspecting the damage. Several times aircraft were kept circling
for prolonged periods and had to return to base for fuel. Tempers
became frayed by frequent changes in orders and confusion over
the order of events. Billy Mitchell later alleged that the Navy
21
was deliberately trying to prevent the sinking of the battleship.
Whether or not this allegation was justified, it was certainly
true that the events of the 26th did not look impressive to
20
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the observers or to the public. No serious damage had been done
to the "Ostfriesland", and the press hastily printed headlines
such as "Flyers Fail to Sink Teuton Battleship". Morale sagged
somewhat at Langley Field, until Billy told his flyers that the
morrow was the day that counted. General Pershing and Secretary
Weeks, who had spent the rather dull day aboard the "Henderson",
decided to forego watching the next day's events. Instead they
spent a relaxing day at the Officers 1 Club at Fortress Monroe.
JUly 21st was to be the concluding day of the tests.
Mitchell's flyers were to drop 1000-pounders first and were to
be allowed three direct hits. The Navy insisted on the original
ground rules, limited direct hits to two, and thus provided
material for more acrimony later on. Of course the Navy was now
aware that Billy had 2000 pound bombs available, and that their
original rules allowed two hits "with the heaviest bombs".
He was therefore to be allowed to make one bombing run with his
2000-pounders, after which the Navy planned to try to sink the
target ship with gunfire from the II. 8. S. "Pennsylvania". If this
failed, a wrecking party from the U.S.S. "North Dakota" was to
destroy the ship by attaching mines and depth charges to her hull.
Obviously naval experts believed the "Ostfriesland" was next to
unsinkabie, and she had to be destroyed by the -July 31st deadline.
Arguments started almost as soon as the bombing began. Lieutenant
Clayton Bissell led the first formation of Martins over the target
and dropped five 1000-pounders in quick succession. Three of these
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FIGURE III
S 68511
NPS-jL Heavy Bomber of 1921 (Original designation MB2 )
(by Glenn L. Martin Co.,CurtiS6 Aircraft, and L.W.F.Corp.)
The Bombers that Sank the "G*tfrieslar*d", July 21, 1921.
Specifications
:
T'ingspan
Length
Gross '"eight
Engines
Range
Bomb load
Max . 3peed -
Service ceiling -
74 » 2"
42' 8"
12,100 lbs.
Two Liberty V-1460 (420hp each)
400 miles
2,000 lbs.
98 miles per hour
8,000 feet
(tata from US Army Aircraft 1908-1945
,
p. 15.)
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were direct hits and the Navy cried "Foul!" After frantic sig-
nalling, the bobbers were called off the target and ordered back
to base. Lieutenant Bissell, incensed, led his squadron past the
"Henderson" and dropped all the remaining bombs, live, in the
water. The terrific explosions caused consternation aboard the
command ship, but surprisingly enough there were no protests.
Possibly the observers appreciated having a dull day livened up.
Examination of the "Ostfriesland" showed that, although
considerably damaged, she was still intact. Still fairly confident,
the Navy sent word to Billy Mitchell that he was to proceed to the
target with a maximum of three 2000-pound bombs. Billy sensed that
this was a last-ditch attempt to prevent him from getting his
two allowable direct hits, and he disregarded the order. He tersely
informed the naval commander that his aircraft were on the way to
the target and would continue to drop bombs until they secured
their authorized two direct hits. Billy was after this battleship
and everything that it meant to his Air Service. He was not about
to let any ground-rule technicalities ruin his opportunity.
The final bombing of the great battleship was as dramatic
as its buildup had been tense. With Billy watching from his little
"Osprey", the formation of Martins and Handley-Pages moved
ponderously over the target ship, Only six bombs were dropped. Of
the first five, one was a direct hit and the others were in the
water alongside. These were the "water-hammer" explosions Billy
really wanted, and their force could be felt aboard the "Henderson".
The sixth was a direct hit, and the bombing was halted at that
Point.
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As the spray and smoke settled, the target ship could
be seen, still solid in the water. For a few minutes Navy ob-
servers were sure she was unhurt. Then they noticed she was
settling by the stern. Suddenly, before their unbelieving eyes,
the dreadnaught lurched and rolled completely over, then dipped
down under the waves and silently slid out of sight. She was
gone just twenty-one and a half minutes aft-v:* the first big
bomb was dropped. As she rolled, her hull had been exposed to
the view of all the onlookers, and the great holes where the
water-hammer had crushed her plates were clearly visible. As if
to emphasize the bombers' power to spare, the last of the departing
Handley-Pages dropped an unused bomb in the center of the green
swirl where the "Ostfriesland" had been. The detonation was
almost a farewell salute.
According to observers, there were tears in the eyes of
many old Navy men as the great ship went under, but they could
not deny Billy Mitchell his moment of triumph. As he flew low
past the "Henderson", his arm raised high out of the cockpit in
victory, the command ship rang with spontaneous cheers. Resent
him as they might, the navymen could recognize a spectacular
job well done. As he had done so often, Billy had made good on
his promise; he had done what he said he could do. Obviously
aircraft could sink battleships, as he had insisted.
Emotionally, professionally, and dramatically, the 21st
of July, 1921, must be regarded as the zenith of Billy Mitchell's
career. He was the darling of the press. He was the young
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challenger who had jousted with the champions and had won
magnificently. He had proven his point in the full glare of
publicity - he had shown what air power could do rather than
just talk about it. He had once again shown that he was at his
best when called upon to deliver, that he was a courageous
fighter against odds. Professionally he had demonstrated his
stature as a brilliant tactician, an imaginative technician,
a superb organizer and leader of men. Unfortunately what he
really wanted the public to understand - the capabilities of
his Air Service, its planes and its men - was overshadowed by
the hero-worship lavished upon him as an individual. He would
soon find that this had been a hollow victory - a public triumph
with no lasting result.
.
Billy and his men could sink the "Ostfriesland", but
men, ideas and institutions could not be sunk so easily. It is
frequently easier to make enemies than friends, especially when
one is successful. Billy was to find out that he now had more
enemies than ever before, and he now had ahead of him the fight
of his life.
CHAPTER V
BILLY'S FIGHTING RETREAT (1921-1925)
The euphoria attendant upon the successful completion of
the bombing tests lasted for a few days. At the working level
hilarious celebrations ensued at Langley Field, in which Billy
Mitchell joined with his elated airmen. Meanwhile accolades
poured in from every side. Air-minded Navy men were quick to
point out to their colleagues that a new ingredient had been
indeed added to naval warfare. Admiral Fullam declared thxt the
feat of the airmen"heralds the birth of a new weapon that menaces
the old army quite as much as the old navy." Rear Admiral William
Moffett, the new Chief of Naval Aviation, commented "We must put
planes on battleships and get aircraft carriers quickly!" Navy
Secretary Denby was more reluctant to draw conclusions, but he
did publicly praise the courage and skill of the airmen involved.
Praise came from the Army side as well. General Williams,
proud of the part that his Ordnance department had played in the
tests, called the exploit "an epoch-making performance". General
A. p. Snow, Chief of Field Artillery, expressed his amazement at
the accuracy, range and destructive power of the air-borne weapons.
Even General Menoher, who had so recently sought Mitchell's
dismissal, happily wired his troublesome subordinate: "You have
made history!" Later he commented further: "A cold fact has been
demonstrated ... that the battleship can be sunk by the aerial bomb."
34
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Glenn L. Martin, basking in the reflected glory of his big
bombers, exulted: "No fleet afloat is safe if it loses control
of the air ... History is being made."
Most widely quoted of the comments was that attributed to
Air Commodore Charlton of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm. As an
attache he had watched the tests and sententious ly declared
1
"Today a bomb was fired that will be heard round the world!"
The only sour note in this paean of praise was sounded
by Denby's Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore ltoosevelt Jr.,
who resorted to a characteristic idiom when he observed: "I once
saw a man kill a lion with a .30-30 caliber rifle, under certain
conditions. But that does not me&& that a .30-30 rifle is a
lion gun
.
Most puzzling was the attitude exhibited by the Secretary
of War, John Weeks. Although it was his service that had been
covered with glory by Mitchell's success, Weeks seemed unhappy
about it. He maintained a brooding silence and refused any comment
to reporters for a full day after the final sinking. Then, possibly
encouraged by young Teddy Roosevelt's dissenting opinion, Weeks
let loose a blast in a letter to the Editor of the Hartford (Conn.)
Courant. Under the circumstances the unreasonable and bitter
1
Gauvreau & Cohen, Op.cit
. ,p. 171. Cf .Levine, Op.cit. ,p.260.
2
Levine, Op.cit
.
,p.261. Cf .Mitchell, Ruth, Qp.cit . , p. 272.
Hiss Mitchell erroneously identifies the Assistant as Franklin D.
Roosevelt, as do several other writers. Franklin Roosevelt was
Assistant Secretary during the preceding (Wilson) administration.
8ee text, p. 49.
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tirade he poured forth was not only totally unexpected but also
quite baffling.
"I'm not going to be stampeded by a circus performer"
wrote Weeks. "Mitchell is putting a lot of foolish ideas in the
heads of the people, and one of these days we may have to get
rid of him. I stand by Pershinr *r opinions-, which are good
enough for me. He won the war without even looking into an alr-
plsae, let alone going up in one ...We'll stick to the arr_y on
3
the ground.
"
It would be hard to find a more blunt and ostrich-like
expression of the conservati\»e military philosophy than this,
coming as it did from the civilian head of the United States
Army. One might well comment that Julius Caesar won wars without
gunpowder too. Just what made Weeks so unusually bitter at this
point is difficult to understand, but his attitude seems indica-
tive of the hardening position of the ground officers and their
superiors now that the challenge to their supremacy was becoming
tangible. Weeks was not alone. In fact nobody at the policy-
making level of the armed forces showed the slightest sign of
encouragement to the Air Service in spite of the tests. Nor was
another word mentioned about the unified services proposal Harding
had hinted at some months earlier.
In the light of developments of later years, it is worth
noting that some of the most enthusiastic praise for Mitchell's
feat came from overseas. British Navy men were quite vocal.
3
Hartford (Conn.) Courant
,
August 2,1921.
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Admiral Sir Percy Scott gruffly observed: " This proves that the
capital ship is no damn use at all. The question is what is Lord
Lee (First Lord of the Admiralty) going to do with his battleships?
4
Have we any safe funkholes to hide them in?" Here again one might
acidly comment that lessons are learned slowly: the "Prince of Wales"
and the "Repulse", among other battleships, were built many years
later
!
Significantly, America's future Axis enemies were well
represented at the tests. The Italian General Pietro Badoglio
watched, took notes and said nothing. Under II Duce, his country
was soon to become notably air-minded, and 1933 would see a fleet
of Italian naval planes cross the ocean as a unit. But there would
be the "Cavour" and the "Roma", to be sent to the bottom in the
next war.
Admiral Reinnard Scneer, commander of the defeated German
Navy, instructed his countrymen: "The recent experiments in
America make it clear tnat a battleship can be sunk by airplanes.
Thus the airplane . . . may be said to furnish better service than
5
a large and expensive ship." Again, ironically, the -ext war
woulc. ste Admiral Scheer's name on the stern of a new battleship
which would, of course, be sunk by R.A.F. aircraft at Kiel.
Most interesting of all was the unguarded prophecy of
the Hon. G. Katsuda, official Japanese observer at the tests.
"It would be gravely embarrassing to the American people" said
Mr. Katsuda, "if the ideas of your General Mitchell were more
4
Mitchell, Ruth, Op. cit ., p. 270-271.
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appreciated In Jfefan than in the United States. Gratitude is
6
not one of the attributes of democracy." The Japanese learned
their lesson well, but it was apparent that old ideas died hard
there too. They continued to build battlewagons, virtually all
of which would be sent to the bottom of the Pacific, including
the mighty "Yamato", the largest battleship ever built, sunk by
American planes before she even had a chance to get into combat.
Yes, new ideas had been sown by Billy's success, but old
ideas held grimly on. In spite of the trenchant comments of
observers, the major nations of the world would continue to
build battleships, bigger and better ones. The next World War,
twenty years after the Virginia Capes, would see twenty-nine
mighty dreadnaughts sink beneath the waves the way the "Ostfriesland"
had, most of them victims, at least in part, of air attack.'
In the United States the official position swung more and
more around to the theme that the Air Service's success had been
luck and nothing more. For Billy Mitchell the bitterest blow of
all came with the issuance of the report of the Joint Board of
the Army and Navy relative to the results of the bombing tests.
Signed by its chairman, General Pershing, on August 19, 1921, it
summarized its findings:
"The development of aircraft, instead of furnish ng an
economical instrument of war leading to the abolition of the
battleship, has but added to the complexity of naval warfare.
6
Mitchell, Ruth, Op.clt . ,p.270. Cf.Gauvreau & Cohen,
Op.cit
. ,
pp. 66-67.
7
See Table III, p. 89.
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Table 3
BATTLESHIPS DESTROYED OR SUNK IN WORLD WAR II.
United States Navy Arizona 7 Dec . 1941, Pearl Harbor (air)
Oklahoma 7 Pec . 1941, ^arl Harbor (air)
West Virginia )
Nevada ) put out of action at
California ) Pearl Harbor.
Royal Navy
French Navy
Royal Oak 14 Oct. 1939
Hood 24 May, 1941
Barham 25 Nov. 1941
Prince of ?:ales 9 Pec. 41
Repulse
Bretagne
Provence
Dunkerque
Scapa Flow (sub.)
Atlantic (gunfire)
Mediterranean (sub)
Malaya (air)
9 Dec4! -Malaya (air)
3 July, 1940
3 July, 1940
3 July, 1940
•Oran (air)
-Oran (air)
-fcran (ran aground)
Italian Navy
German Navy
Japanese Navy
Cavour
Roma
Graf Spee
Bismarck
Scharnhorst
Gnoise \au
Tirpitz
Adm. Scheer
Lutzow
Hiyei
Kiriehina
Mutsu
Musashi
Fuso
Yamashiro
Kongo
Yamato*
Hyuga
Harun
a
Ise
1940 - Mediterranean (air)
9 Sept. 1943 - Mediterranean (air)
17 Dec. 1939 -
27 May 1941
26 Dec. 1943 •
1944
12 Nov. 1944 •
9 Apr. 1945 -
16 Apr. 1945 -
13 Nov. 1942 •
15 Nov. 1942 -
8 June 1943-
24 Oct. 1944 -
25 Oct. 1944 -
25 Oct. 1944 •
21 Nov. 1944 -
7 Apr. 1945 -
24 Julyl945 -
28 July1845 -
28 Julyl945 -
-Montevideo (surface)
• Brest (Burf.lt air)
- Norway (surface)
North Sea (air)
• Norway (air)
• Kiel (air)
Kiel (air)
• Solomons (subbair)
• °.olomons (sub7air)
off Japan (sub)
Phil. Sea (air)
• Phil. Sea (air)
• Phil. Sea (air)
China Sea (sub)
Kyushu (air)
• Kur j (air)
Kure (air)
Kure (air)
1
The "Yamato" was the largest battleship ever built, grossing
72,303 tons. It was bombed and sunk by American aircraft while oa
its trial runs before entering service.
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The battleship is still the backbone of the fleet."
In the meantime Billy Mitchell had submitted his own
report on the tests to his superior, General Menoher. Naturally
his findings were diametrically opposite to those of the Pershing
report, and called for a major program of development of the
bomber force and fcr no further construction of battleships.
Mitchell f s report was quietly filed away. No one seems to know
how, but on September 12th Billy*s report suddenly appeared in
the nationwide press. An editorial in the New York Times the
following day intimated cryptically that persons "high in political
9
circles believe there may be a housecleaning in the air service."
Whether this hint was directed at Mitchell or at General Menoher
is not entirely clear, but Billy entered the "iscussion publicly.
He again brought up his demand for a unified department of defense,
aad charged that the Navy was blocking this necessary development.
Seeing controversy beginning to swirl once more, General
Menoher decided he had reached the end of the road. P.emembering
the events of a few months earlier, Menoher went to Secretary
Weeks and asked to be relieved unless the Secretary would back
hira up in disciplining Mitchell, ^eeks adhered to his Pilate-like
poaitioa, telling the old cavalryman that if he could not handle
his subordinate himself, he wovl^ probably do just as well to seek
another command. This was enough for Menoher, who resigned forthwith.
3
Extract report of Joint Board of Army and Navy, Aug. 19, 1921.
Copy ia the Mitchell Papers, Library of Congress.
9
New York Times, Sept . 14, 1921.
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Although there was some agitation for Mitchell's promotion
to the top post, old Air Service hands considered this an irapossi-
10
bility. Instead, in an interesting echo of 1916, the War
Department reached into the same file that General Pershing had
used during the war, and came up with the same name. The old
Engineer, Major General Mason M. Patrick, was appointed Chief of
the Air Service, and Mitchell was retained as his assistant.
While this change of superiors was being accomplished,
Billy was at Langley Field again, busily sinking another battle-
ship, the old "Alabama" which had been headed for the scrap-heap.
On his return to Washington, Billy found his old chief, General
Patrick, installed in office. The two men confronted each other
on a Saturday afternoon, October 15th. Billy was told in no
uncertain terms that Patrick intended to be Chief in deed as well
as in name, and that he intended to reserve all final decisions
to himself. While Billy recognized this as a reasonable demand,
he was keenly aware that Patrick was no flyer. He knew, too, that
the older man had been placed in this job primarily to act as a
checkrein on his assistant. Tired of chafing under the restraints
imposed by ground officers, Billy told Patrick he would resign.
The two went together to the office of the Chief of Personnel,
Major General John G. Harbord. As luck would have it, Harbord
was out of town for the weekend, and the two men had until Monday
to cool down. In the interim Billy decided, for once in his life,
to back down. He agreed to Patrick's terms and from that time on
10
Arnold, Op.cit . ,p. 105.
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relations between the two were relatively cordial. Patrick later
admitted that Mitchell "had a better knowledge of the tat tics of
air fighting than any man in the country" but observed that he
had "an undoubted love of the limelight" and that he "would lose
11
no opportunity to take a fling at the Navy."
Billy's term of office as Assistant Chief was due to run
for four years from April 27th, 1921, the date of his reappointment.
There can be no question that during these four years he was a
troublesome officer, sometimes as welcome as a hornet in the staid
circles of Washington officialdom. Even his own subordinates
recognized this, and although they idolized the man they were at
times embarrassed by his importunities. One of his staunchest
supporters, "Hap" Arnold, writing in 1949, observed:
Billy had much in common with George Armstrong Custer and
George Crook of Civil War days, or George 3. Patton,Jr., of
fo World War II - wonderful war leaders who have originality and
are respected by their men, but who seemingly cannot get along
in the regulation-controlled peacetime army...
Billy's youthful record in the Spanish War was beyond
criticism. His World War I record was superb. As a leader, an
air strategist, in employment of aircraft, he was unsurpassed.
Bui: - along with his fruitfully unorthodox imagination - his
uniform was always a bit different fr_m that of other officers;
he couldn't wait for the normal routing of War Department
procedures to get results, and he became a thorn in the side
of not only the War Department, but of the Navy Department
as well. 12
Coming from the only flyer ever to hold five-star rank1^
Hap Arnold's comments are certainly a balanced appraisal.
11
Levine, Op.clt.
,
p. 274.
12
Arnold, Op.cit
. , p. 107.
13
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, although awarded a pilot's
fating at age 49, is not here considered a "flyer "in the true sense.
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Apparently satisfied that General Patrick was firmly in
the saddle, Secretary Weeks took a further step toward restraining
Billy. Tired of complaints from the Navy, ?Jeeks concluded that
it was "an unwise thing" to permit unrestricted inter-service
propaganda. With this in mind, he specifically directed Billy
"if he had anything more to say in print", to submit his state-
ments first to the War Department for approval. This relati\rely
mild stricture was later to prove a key factor in bringing Billy
before a court-martial.
In December , 1921, the big word was disarmament. The
Washington Conference was In session - Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes had made hir dramatic proposal for the
scrapping of warships. Looking back, it is not hard to see that
the climate of the times was not a sympathetic one for Billy
Mitchell's ideas on building up military forces. It is worth
speculating that Billy's destruction of the "Ostfriesland" and
the "Alabama" may have encouraged the administration to go ahead
with ii,s drastic proposals for reduction of naval armament - the
thought may have been instilled that battleships might not be as
important as people had thought. In any event, it was just at
this time that Billy Mitchell was sent to Europe to conduct a
thorough survey of foreign aviation developments. His place on
the armaments committee of the Conference was taken by General
Patrick. Whether Billy was deliberately packed off during this
time cannot be proven, but the conference did go smoothly, and
94
the decision was made to scrap a total of sixty-eight capital
14
ships, twenty-eight of them American. Further, two large
battle cruisers under construction were to be converted to
aircraft carriers (the ,,Lexington ,, and "Saratoga" of World War II
lame). On his return to Washington Billy was gratified by the
fact that no limitations had been placed on military aircraft.
He observed ruefully, however, that the onl, such limitation
15
was imposed by his own government.
During his European visit Billy had taken a hard look
at aviation developments in Britain, France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Italy and Germany. He had conferred with governmental leaders
and aircraft technicians everywhere he went. In Germany, so
recently defeated in war, he was particularly impressed by the
upsurge of spirit and creative vitality and the keen interest
in aviation that he found. He returned determined to do all in
his power to match this vitality in his own country.
During the next three years Billy pursued a policy of
constructive development within the Air Service. While he could
not resist an occasional controversial statement, he generally
adhered to the strictures placed on him by the Secretary of War,
and devoted himself to building up the capability of the Air
Service and the public's confidence in it. Considering the
primitivr, financially pinched service he had to work with, the
record was impressive.
14
-ratt, Julius V;., A History of United States Foreign
policy
, pp.524 ff.
15
Levine, Op.cit
.
,p.276.
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Due to the glut of wartime DH-4 , s in the inventory,
very little money could be had from Congress to equip the
service with modern materiel. According to Billy's theories,
bombardment was the heart of an effective air force, so he
concentrated his efforts toward procuring a maximum number of
heavy bombers. From 1920 until May, 1924, the Army Air Service
was able to procure only 455 new aircraft, but of this total
113 were the big NBS series bombers designed by Glenn Martin
and further produced by Curtiss, L.W.F., and Aeroinarine. In
September , 1923 these new bombers were exercised against the
battleships "Virginia" and "New Jersey", slated to be scrapped
under the terms of the Washington Conference. For the first time,
heavy 2000-lb. bombs were dropped on these targets from 10,000 feet
altitude. Both battleships went down, the "Virginia" in twenty-
six minutes.
More imaginative but less successful was Billy's venture
into the super-bomber category. Convinced that the desired range
and load could only be achieved when the industry succeeded in
developing a really big airplane, Billy backed the investment of
considerable money in a mighty experimental aircraft called the
Barling bomber after its designer. Not understanding the problems
of aeronautical designing, many critics accused Billy of allowing
tremendous amounts of money to be wasted on a spectacular flop.
Actually a great deal was learned from this effort.
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FIGURE IV
WITTBMAN;; LEWIS XNEI.-l
The "Barling Bomber"
Specifications
:
Wingspan - 120 feet (15 feet more than Boeing B-17)
Length - 65 feet
Gross '..'eight- 42,363 lbs.(vs 37,300 for original B-17)
Engines - Six Liberty V-1460 - 420hp each
(4 tractor .«nd 2 pusher)
Design bomb load - 6,000 lbs. (did not materialize)
Top speed - 95 mph.
Chief failures were in range and altitude capability.
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The Barling, officially designated the XNBL-1 (experimental
night bombardment - long-range), was built by the Witteman-Lewis
Corporation at Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, and shipped in
sections to Wilbur Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, for flight tests.
The aircraft was truly a monster. A triplane design with 120-foot
wiagspan, it was powered by six Liberty engines of 420 horsepower
16
apiece, and its total gross weight was 42,5of pounds. Unfortunately
premature publicity led the public to expect great things of this
bomber, and Billy himself was certainly the source oi some of the
extravagant predictions . The aircraft was test-flown for the
first time on August 22, 1923, and it flew satisfactorily enough.
Its extreme inadequacy showed up, however, when an attempt was
made to fly it non-stop from Dayton to Washington. When loaded
with sufficient fuel to make the trip it could not climb high
enough to clear the relatively low Blue Ridge mountains and the
17
trip had to be abandoned. It became apparent that the chief
fault of the Barling was simply the non-existence of sufficiently
powerful engines for it. The fact was demonstrated that adding
more engines merely added more weight and the requirement for
more fuel without a proportional increase in performance. This
consideration loomed large in Charles A. Lindbergh's decision
four years later to use a single-engined plane for his epic
1«
Atlantic flight. So the Barling gathered cobwebs in a large
16
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17
Arnold, op. ext . , p . 120
.
18
Lindbergh, Charles A.. The Spirit of St. Louis , pp. 26-29.
98
hangar at Wright Field, and the Air Service had to wait twelve
years until the development of a thousand-horsepower engine
made an airplane of its size practical.
Aside from the ill-fated Barling project, Billy»s ventures
during these years were blessed with spectacular success. Convinced
that the people had to be shown , he sought every opportunity to
demonstrate the growing capability of airplanes. The record
speaks for itself
:
June 16, 1922 - World's high altitude parachute jump
record - 24,200 feet, from an Army balloon.
October 18,1922 - Forld speed record, 224.38 m.p.h.,
set by Pilly Mitchell himself in a Curtiss racer.
November 16, 1922 - First mock warfare bombing attack
on a U.S. city, Washington, D. C
.
May 6, 1923 - First non-stop flight across the United
States, by Lieutenants Xelly and Macready in a Fokker T-2, from
Mitchel Field, TTew York to San Diego, California in 26 hours,
50 minutes.
June 23, 1924 - Dawn-to-dusk transcontinental flight,
in a production Curtiss iJW-8 pursuit - 21 hours, 50 minutes.
September 22, 1024 - Completion of the first flight
around the world, Seattle to Boston, using Douglas WC aircraft,
in 153 days elapsed time.
The "Virginia" and "New Jersey" bombings seemed headed
toward another Mitchell-versus-Navy Donnybrook. The first bombs
from 10,000 feet on the "New Jersey" had not been too accurate
199
so Billy sent in the lethal wave at 3,000 feet. The Navy objected,
and another argument started. Hie TCar Department saw fit at this
point to grant Mitchell an extended leave for a honeymoon with
his second wife, the former Elizabeth Trumbull Miller. (Billy's
first marriage had ended in divorce in 1922, presumably because
Mrs. Mitchell did not enjoy the sensational publicity that
la
continually revolved about her household.) In the course of
this supposedly vacation trip, Billy typically volunteered to
conduct on-the-spot iaspectiono of installations in the Pacific,
specifically Hawaii and the Philippines.
Vfhat Billy saw in Hawaii was enough to give him material
for a 100-page report which ho brought back to Washington, having
left a copy with the Commander of the Hawaiian Department, Major
General Charles P. Summerall. In the light of later even ts, Billy *s
reports on Hawaii and the Philippines must be regarded among his
most remarkable accomplishments, although not 30 recognized at
the time.
The Hawaii report pinpointed what Billy saw as the fatal
flaw in the islands* defenses - the lack of coordination between
the Army and Navy commands . He hammered away at this theme and
also at the glaring lack cf air defenses. In what seemed at the
time a wild flight of fancy, he outlined what he considered the
most likely type of attack that could threaten the islands. Such
an attack, he wrote, would be one by Japanese aviation, specifically
100 airplanes, which would attack Ford Island, Schofield Barracks,
19
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and Honolulu most probably at 7:30 on a Sunday morning. These
aircraft could fly in undetected from the northwest and would
put the fleet and military units out of action. He predicated
this attack on a fast preliminary strike on the island of Niihau
20
and simultaneous reduction of Midway Island and Guam.
How accurate this prediction was can be clearly seen
when one compares the details of the strike on Pearl Harbor on
December 7th, 1941 with the details in Billy's report. The minor
differences include the actual number of aircraft (110 instead of
100), their launch from carriers instead of from TTiihau, and the
reduction of Wake Island instead of Midway. VJake was not developed
in 1924. Cther minor differences are largely the measure of
technical advances in the seventeen intervening years. One is
almost tempted to wonder whether Japanese intelligence could
have had access to this report, but this possibility has never
been seriously suggested. It i3 more likely that Billy was merely
viewing the Islands through the cold eye of a realistic enemy.
When General Summerall read the report he seethed. It was
21
unsolicited, in his view, and while thorough, was "superficial".
General Patrick attempted to smooth over Summerall's objections.
Mitchell's observations, he said, would be of extreme value some
years hence, but the art of aviation had not yet reached the degree
of capability suggested by General Mitchell. Patrick certainly put
20
Copy of thi^ report in its entirety is in the Mitchell
papers
,
Library of Congress.
21
Ibid.
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his finger on the problem, and never uttered a truer word. Of
course, by the time aviation did reach the required state of
capability, Hawaii's defenses were no more nearly ready than
they had been in 1924. At the time, Patrick's reply appeased
Summerall, but he still smoldered at the embarrassment he felt
Mitchell had unnecessarily caused him.
In a similar display of seeming clairvoyance, Mitchell's
report on the Philippines outlined, in >3 pages, the paths of
attack that would be followed by the Japanese in the event they
attacked the Islands, and detailed the inadequacies of the defenses.
Seventeen years later the attack came as he had predicted, and the
defenses were still no better prepared to meet it. Right up to
the bottling up of the last aeienders on Bataan and Corregidor,
Billy had forecast the events.
Billy was particularly vocal in the 1920 's in his evalua-
tion of Japan as a strong potential enemy in the Pacific area.
He was especially uneasy about Alaska, and the short airline
distance between the Aleutians and the Japanese Kurile Islands,
he had nad private conversations with President Harding in early
1923. What was said is not known, but it has been speculated that
Billy managed to communicate some of his enthusiasm for Alaska as
a potential American bastion to the President. If £o, it is
conceivable that the problem of air bases may have been one of
the considerations behind Harding's Alaskan trip in 1923, just
22
before his death. In 1924, however, Billy's reports to his
22
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superiors went unheeded, and his public warnings about Japan were
scoffed at. He was called a warmonger, "trying to make 'rouble
between this country and its well-wishing, sincerely friendly
neighbors
.
8
During Eilly*s absence in the Far East, his chief, General
Patrick, had been trying hard, in a 'safe and sound" manner, to
build up the case for air power. At his urging, a board of high-
ranking officers, called the Lassiter Board after its chairman,
Major General William Laceiver, had been convened to formulate a
national air policy. The board found, predictably, that the nation's
air arm was la dire straits and recommended a far-reaching program
over the next ten years to build up the Army Air Service. It
further recommended the establishment of an independent air arm
for combat, in addition to the air units attached to the ground
forces. Secretary Weeks approved the report of the Lassiter Beard
on April 24th, 102C and sent it to the Joint Army-Navy Board.
That was as far as it went. Despite the pleadings of General
Patrick and of air-minded legislators like LaGuardia, no action
was taken. In fact, it v/as not until March, 1935 that the General
Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force was established, much along the lines
23
of the organization recommended by the Lassiter Board.
When Billy returned to Washington in 1924 he was dismayed
at the state of affairs. Having seen what other nations were doing
in the way of air progress, he reached out in every way he could
to make people understand the urgency he felt. In "Liberty" and
23
Buie, Op.cit
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"The Sturday Eveni g Post" and in aviation periodicals, as well
as in speeches and in official testimony, he pointed out the
strides being made in military aviation by Japan, Russia and
Italy, and under cover, by Germany. Within his Air Service he
personally conducted inspection after inspection, and his reports
are marvels of exhaustive thoroughness. In one report, i;hat of
McCook Field in Dayton in 1924, Billy went into every subject in
the most probing and inquiring way. He explored and discussed
personally with engineers the experimental work on aircraft
armament and radio, and made detailed recommendations that they
explore and develop such far-ahead items as catapults, landing-mats
liquid oxygen, metal wings, servo-boosted controls, aircraft
diesel engines, and helicopters. Even at this early date, he knew
the predilection of engineers for loading aircraft with "pet"
contraptions, and in this report he emphasized the dictum:
24
"Performance must never be sacrificed for maintenance."
Work as he might, Billy was finding himself forced more
and more iatc a fighting retreat. The climate of disarmament
reached into the Air Service, as the War Lepartment deactivated
two squadrons and reduced J.ree more to skeleton strength.
Moreover the new occupant of the White House, Calvin Coolidge,
seemed hostile to Mitchell from the very start. In personality,
tvio men could not have been more dissimilar. An avowed exponent
of disarmament and of economy, Coolidge had little use for aviation
and appeared to have an instinctive dislike for Mitchell. The
24
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spectacle of Billy dashing ail over the country ia his personal
25
airplane, "with speed written aii over him"
,
did not appeal to
the President, who regarded it as though he were personally paying
the fuel bill. Billy, fighter that he was, felt that he had to
speak up for what he believed was right. Coolidge, however, viewed
Billy's free-swinging tactics with a jaundiced eye. Billy's more
tactful and perceptive subordinate, the then Lieutenant Colonel
"Hap 1 ' Arnold, reports this revealing conversation with Mitchell
about this time:
"Billy, take it easy .'
'
: tpleaded Arnold) "We need ycu.
Don't throw everything away just to beat out some guy who
doesn't understand! Air power is coming! Calm down, Billy!
Get a balance wheel in your office. Let him look over some
of the things you write before you put them out! otop saying
all those things about the independent air arm that are
driving these old Army and Navy people crazy!"
But Billy earnestly replied, "When senior officers won't
see facts, something unorthodox, perhaps an explosion, is
necessary. I'm doing it for the good of the air force, for
the future Air Force, for tAe good of you fellows. I can
afford to do it. You can't !" 26
The Teapot Dome exposures of 1924 were foiloweu by wholesale
shakeups in the Administration and by a rash of Congressional
inquiries. Among the heads that rolled was that of Navy becretary
Denby, who was succeeded by Bwight Wilbur, a man with no naval
experience whatever since hie graduation from Annapolis in 1&S£».
Mitchell caustically remarked later: "How Coolidge happened to
pick that bird is one oi the fascinating mysteries of his adminis-
tration. He must have known less about airplanes than the peanut
vendor in front of the White House." He told friends that Wilbur
25
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reminded hint of a story that was told about Gideon Welles,
Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy. When first appointed, so the
story went, Welles cautiously boarded one of the Navy's old
wooden ships, peered into the hold and stepped back, aghast.
27
"My God!" he exclaimed. "It's hollow?"
About this time another Congressional committee was
formed, with the imposing title of Select Committee of Inquiry
into Operations of the United States Air Services, otherwise
known as the Lamport Committee after its chairman, Representative
Florian Lamport (R-Q.) Its purpose was to probe the "air trust"
allegations that had been leveled by disgruntled inventors, and
to look into the whole picture of air power. The committee hearings
became most involved and very heated, and indirectly greased the
tracks for Billy Mitchell's removal from his position.
The hearings developed into a battle between the "Battleship
School" and the reformers led by Mitchell and Admiral Moffett.
It soon became apparent that their superiors objected to the
candid testimony being given by these officers, and Congressman
Rudolph Perkins (R.-N.J. ) of the committee alleged that both
Mitchell and Moffett had been threatened with disciplinary action
for their testimony.
The issue of the freedom of military officers to testify
before Congressional committees has been raised many times since
1924, but at that time it was a new point of controversy. Although
27
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Secretary Wilbur denied that any threat had been made to lloffett,
Secretary Weeks was significantly silent about Mitchell. Billy,
characteristically, was anything but silent. Before the committee
he accused certain witnesses of deliberately falsifying facts
In order to discredit his testimony. He further Insisted that
stay officers were afraid to testify, for fear of reprisals, and
offered to name names If the committee desired. Later Billy
amplified these accusations and ticked off the names of several
highly-placed officers as having given false testimony. These
included Army Major General Hugh A. Drum, Marine Corps Major
General LeJeune, Bear Admirals Hillary P. Jones and Lewis Strauss,
and even Navy Secretary Wilbur. He also named Admiral Moffett as
having been afraid to testify fully. He submitted all these names
In a communication to the War Department, submitted through his
Chief, General Patrick, in reply to an official demand that he
justify his remark to the committee.
In a final Indorsement to this communication, General
Patrick, showing considerable restraint, recommended to the
Adjutant General that Mitchell be "admonished by the War Department
for his attitude and his methods" and that he be cautioned against
"the use of Immoderate language In the future." The still somewhat
sympathetic Patrick added in his concluding paragraphs the
following comments:
7. I still think the charge that there were any intentional
misrepresentations or efforts knowingly to confuse Congress
is unwarranted.
8. While I can understand a measure of indlgpft^efl- o» the
part of anyone correctly Informed, when confronted by
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evidence so foreign to the facts as General Mitchell sees
them, this does not excuse a charge of bad faith on the
part of the witnesses.
9. I therefore recommend that General Mitchell's attention
be called to the language employed by him, and cautioned
that hereafter under similar circumstances, if they arise,
he confine himself to a statement of the facts controverting
such incorrect testimony and refrain from any assault upon
the integrity of reputable witnesses. 28
Once again the press entered the lists on one side or the
other. The majority appeared to side with Mitchell, and the New
York Post coined the word "Mitchellism" to describe Billy's
candidly rebellious approach. Admiral Fullan, from a sick bed,
rose to Billy's defense with a remarkably sympathetic statement.
He admitted that "the Navy in the beginning was at fault in
precipitating a disagreeable and unpleasant controversy." Pointing
out that Mitchell had been continually derided by high officials,
he said it was only natural that he and his men would fight back.
"General Mitchell" he said, "has done more to demonstrate the power
of air attack against the forces of our possible enemies (italics
nine) than the general board of the Navy and all the admirals of
29
the Navy combined.
"
On February 19,1925, reports appeared in the press that
Secretaries Weeks and Wilbur had served notice on President
Coolidge that they would both resign if Mitchell remained on the
job. Although both denied this, the feeling persisted that
Mitchell's days were numbered. The impression was well-founded.
28
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dated 11 Mar. 1925, to WDAGO (basic letter from Gen. Patrick directed
by the Secretary of War) - Mitchell Papers
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For it was revealed much later on that on January 6, 1925, Weeks
bad sent a strong confidential memorandum to the President indi-
cating his Intention to drop Billy at the end of his four-year
tour. Weeks ended his memorandum as follows:
...General Mitchell's whole course has been so lawless,
so contrary to the building up of an efficient organization,
so lacking in reasonable teamwork, so indicative of a personal
desire for publicity at the expense of everyone with whom he
is associated that his actions render him unfit for a high
administrative position such as he now occupies. I write this
with great regret because he is a gallant officer with an
excellent war record, but his record since the war has been
such that he has forfeited the good opinion of those who are
familiar with the facts and who desire to promote the best
interests of national defense.
Respectfully yours, 30
John W. Weeks
Thus was well expressed the reaction of the regulation
men, the upholders of law and order, peace and quiet, to the
presence among them of a too-persistent hornet. The public was
oot informed of the existence of this memorandum until it was
read by the prosecution at the Mitchell court-martial late that
year.
Secretary Weeks had one score to settle with Billy while
he was still on the job. Billy had consistently maintained that
anti-aircraft defense was of negligible worth in repelling air
attack. The War Department was anxious to prove the opposite.
Accordingly, a demonstration was arranged for the 6th of March
at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, to test anti-aircraft defenses
30
Memorandum to the President from the Secretary of War,
4 March, 1925 (inauguration day for the second Coolidge adminis-
tration) Copy in the Mitchell Papers , Container 58, Library of
Congress
.
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against attacking aircraft. Weeks wanted Billy to participate
personally in these tests, feeling probably that a public
humiliation was in order before Billy was dropped from his job.
As it turned out, this invitation was not a wise move.
On the day of the public demonstration, everything came
out as Billy had predicted. His aircraft flew slowly across Old
Point Comfort towing sleeve targets, and the anti-aircraft fire
missed them completely. During the night exercises, a typical
Mitchell touch was added. While the searchlights and the new
sound-locators were zeroing in on the aircraft formation, Billy
had his unit throttle back their engines and drop into a steep
glide in the dark. The locators and lights lost them completely,
and a few minutes later Billy's bombers swept in silently across
the beach at rooftop level, opened their throttles with a roar
and thundered over the gun positions in a perfect mock attack.
This was Billy's last victory, and it finished him. When
President Coolidge's new administrative team took office in March,
1925, General Patrick was reappointed as Chief of the Air Service,
but Mitchell was not retained as his assistant. Colonel James
Fechet was promoted to Brigadier General and appointed in his
stead. In an undated memorandum written later in the year, Billy
commented that General Patrick had recommended his reappointment.
Further, referring to his controversial testimony before the
Lamport Committee, he commented that the War Department had at
that time said nothing whatever, had asked him no questions and
had not cautioned him. "The usual Army tactics were employed,"
HQ
be wrote, " give a so-called radical enough rope and he will
hang himself — the only difference being that the War Department
31
did the hanging .
"
Here, as often, Billy's tone seems that of a malcontent
soldier rather than that of a senior officer. There is a decided
ambivalence in his public statements, in that some are extremely
selfless and high-minded and some sound simply peevish and seif-
pitying. Possibly the "balance-wheel" that Arnold had recommended
would have helped. Possibly a psychiatrist might detect a trace
of the schizoid personality in some of Billy's actions and
utterances - so mercurial, so extravagant, so bitter, and at
times so contagiously exuberant. Be that as it may, Billy's
day in the sun as a policy-maker and leader was ended.
31
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CHAPTER VI
THE COURT-MARTIAL (1925-1926)
After his relief from duty, Billy reverted to his
permanent rank of Colonel. Many writers, at the time and since,
have liked to refer to this personnel action as a "demotion",
which it actually was not. The general's star went with the job
of Assistant Chief, and terminated with the expiration of the
assignment. In most cases, however, an attempt was made to assign
an outgoing staff officer to another position in the field
calling for similar rank. In Billy's case this was not done.
In fact, the humiliating part of Billy's reassignment was that
he was not given any command post at all. Instead he was trans-
ferred to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, as "Air Officer" in the Head-
quarters of the Eighth Corps Area. This was a liaison assignment
on a ground army post, with no assigned duties, and was obviously
intended to be what much of the press called it, an "exile".
This particular post became a favorite "Siberia" for air-power
extremists in years to come. Billy's simple office at "Fort Sam"
would later be occupied by Colonel (formerly Lieutenant General)
Frank M. Andrews, and by Lieutenant Colonel (formerly Colonel)
Hugh J. Knerr, banished under similar circumstances.''
1
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Although Billy's partisans in the fourth estate raised
a hue and cry over the "exile" of their hero, others took a
rather righteous and sanctimonious view. The New York Times
expressed this side of the argument in an insufferably smug,
unrealistic and characteristic editorial on March 7th, 1925:
...the argument that rotation should not occur in his
case because he had shown ability and zeal as General
Patrick's subordinate had no foundation ... His normal
rotation would have caused no stir except for the publicity
of the case . .
.
It will be neither humiliation nor punishment for
General Mitchell to accept a detail to a flying field where
his talents may have full play , (italics mine)
A good soldier obeys orders ... Mitchell's cause is a
good one, but his methods could not be tolerated if discipline
was to be maintained. 2
Although far from the Washington cockpit, Billy was
anything but idle. Bidding his friends keep up the fight in
official circles, he devoted himself to a round of speechmakiag,
writing, and meetings. He completed his book Winged Defense and
sent it to the publishers, and did most of the work on his book
Skyways . His friends in Milwaukee urged him to run for Congress,
but he turned them down. In his refusal he stressed his conviction
that the politicians were responsible for the military mess, and
that he would have no chance if he were one of them. "The people
will believe me, he wrote, "if I expect nothing of them." In
spite of his parental heritage and his obvious popularity, Billy
never manifested anything but disdain for the political arena.
He liked popularity but he did not like to ask for it.
2
New York Times, March 7, 1925. Editorial.
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Six months of uneasy quiet passed in Washington and in
San Antonio. Then on the 1st and 3rd of September, 1925, two
events occurred which catapulted Billy on to the national stage
for the last act in his controversial career.
On September 1st, a Navy seaplane, the PN-S No. 1, flown
by Commander John Rodgers, went down in the Pacific and was
presumed lost. The PN-9 No.l had been part of a four-ship flight
from California to Hawaii. The other three aircraft had turned
back, and Rodgers had run out of fuel. According to many critics
at the time, insufficient rescue ships had been provided for
along the route and the mission had been inadequately planned.
While sections of the press made accusations of mismanagement,
a second and far more spectacular disaster struck.
The long arm of coincidence reached far out to frazzle
the public's nerves this time. On Sunday, August 30th, the Roto-
gravure Section of the New York Times had displayed an alarming
photograph of a wrecked dirigible with the caption: "A Tragedy
at Lakehurst - The Wreck of the Shenandoah - Only a Model".
Closer inspection showed the wreck to be that of a scale model
of the great dirigible, a model that had cracked up in flight at
the Navy airship base. The chuckles over this little joke had
hardly died down, when only four days later real tragedy struck.
On September 3rd, the mighty dirigible "Shenandoah" itself,
ou a publicity tour of midwestern state fairs, crashed in a storm
near Caldwell, Ohio. Its pilot, Commander Zachary Lansdowne, and
fourteen crewmen fell to their deaths. As the airship broke up in
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mid-air, Lieutenant Charles Rosendahl maneuvered the stern section
as a free balloon and brought it safely to the ground, saving the
lives of 27 men besides himself. Commander Lansdowne's widow
bitterly alleged that her husband had protested against this
flight and had predicted his own death. The crash was attributed
to weather conditions which were unknown to the crew and of which
they could not have been informed with the aids then extant. The
dirigible had been dispatched far from its base at Lakehurst, New
Jersey, with no facility to which it could nave gone in case of
emergency. The crew had no parachutes. It was alleged that half of
the "Shenandoah's" relief valves had been removed "for reasons of
economy". The airship, originally designed for the use of hydrogen
gas as a lifting agent, was equipped with helium, safer from a
fire standpoint, but only one third as buoyant, a factor wh&ch
may not have been adequately considered in her conversion since
her gross weight had not been changed. All in all, many questions
hung in the air in the wake of the great dirigible's destruction.
And for answers, many reporters turned to the man they considered
America's number one airman, Billy Mitchell, in his exile at
San Antonio.
Billy was silent for three days, weighing what he should
do. The two tragedies were very personal to him. Commander Rodgers
was his friend, so was Commander Lansdowne, and several of his crew.
Billy felt every aviation disaster keenly as though it were a
Physical hurt, but this was more. These were his friends, and he
felt the disasters were totally unnecessary. As he studied the
115
evidence available to him, Billy could only see these losses as
being directly attributable to management of flying activities
by ground people. "Dangerous idiots in power," he called them,
3
"who have never traveled in dirigibles or airplanes . " These
were flying men, his kind of people, being sent to their deaths
by incompetent desk officers. Silence was out of the question,
Billy decided. He had to speak out.
At five o'clock in the morning of Saturday, September 5th,
1925, Billy Mitchell admitted to his office the group of reporters
who had been impatiently waiting. He delivered a six-thousand word
statement that let loose all the pent-up frustration and bitterness
that he felt toward the defense establishment. In exhaustive detail
he analyzed the PK-9 and "Shenandoah" disasters, then came through
with his bombshell:
These accidents are the result of the incompetency, the
criminal negligence, and the almost treasonable administration
of our national defense by the Navy and War Departments.
Billy well knew the storm that this public pronouncement
would stir up, and he was sure that he knew the consequences to
himself. This was no personal vendetta on his part. As had been
forecast by his remark to "Hap" Arnold some months earlier, Billy
felt he had to shoulder the burden. He could afford it, he had said.
He was, as always, desperately loyal to his friends. He ended his
3
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blistering statement on this note:
The bodies of my former companions in the air molder under
the soil in America and Asia, Europe and Africa, many - yes,
many sent there directly by official stupidity and incompetence.
We would not be keeping our trust with our departed
comrades were we longer to conceal the facts. 4
****»»»
There was no doubt in Washington that Billy's outburst
meant court-martial. The Administration had had more than enough.
President Coolidge is reported to have instructed Secretary Weeks
g
in so many words, to "do something about that buzzard!" Admiral
Moffett, Billy's one-time supporter, was now in the unfortunate
position of Chief of Naval Aeronautics, and he moaned with
feeling: "I wish he was in Hell!" Moffett further denounced
Mitchell as a man "of unsound mind and suffering from delusions
7
of grandeur." The Secretary of War personally preferred the
charges that were drawn up against Billy, and did so, as was
admitted later, at the direction of the President.
Affairs in Washington were considerably complicated by
the fact that just as the court-martial charges were being drawn
up, Billy was scheduled to appear as a star witness before the
so-called Morrow Board, a Presidentially-appointed board looking
4
Mitchell statement, as quoted in the San Antonio Light ,
Sept. 6, 1925.
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into the status of American air power. There was feeling that
the Morrow Board had been designed as an instrument to squelch
for good the recommendations of the old Lass iter Board, and also
those of the year-old Lamport Committee. At the same time Billy
was about to be subpoenaed to testify before the Naval Board of
Inquiry investigating the "Shenandoah" disaster.
This last Billy managed to sidestep. On the advice of
his personal counsel, Representative Frank K. Reid (R.-Ill.),
he refused to accept a subpoena, on the ground that any testimony
he might give could be used r gainst him in his court-martial.
Admiral Hillary P. Jones, President of the Board of Inquiry,
vigorously challenged this contention. However, it appeared that '
Billy's move was a wise one. A senior member (unidentified) of
the Army General Staff unguardedly remarked to a reporter:
"If Mitchell had testified under oath, we could and would have
used his testimony against him in his court-martial. But it's
8
funny, isn't it?"
The Morrow Board was another matter. Billy was anxious
to make his points before this group, but somehow his appearance
fell flat. His testimony was long-winded and tiresome to many of
the board members. Much of it consisted of a verbatim reading of
his book Winged Defense . At one point, Senator Hiram Bingham
interposed.
"Colonel, in view of the fact that each of the members
8
Herald, (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 9, 1925.
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of this committee has a copy of your book and has read It..."
"Senator J " Billy cut in sharply, "I'm trying to make a
9
point!"
Before the Morrow Board, however, Billy revealed many of
his views on the recent disasters, and on the Administration's
treatment of his recommendations. On the "Shenandoah" he observed:
. . .
the sending of the "Shenandoah" across the mountains
was, in my opinion, a direct violation of the law. The law
states that operations from land bases shall be operated by
the Army, unless atxached to the fleet. The "Shenandoah"
was not, certainly, attached to the fleet. If there was work
to be done, it should have been done from Scott Field,
Belleville, Illinois. The sending of the ship,across the
mountains, under conditions of that kind certainly should
not be done by non-flying officers. 10
Regarding the PN-9, Billy came up with a rather remarkable
example of his frequent extravagant statements:
..There is an airplane, the Army has constructed one,
that could have been used, that can go for about 60 hours
and for about 4500 miles and that airplane can be arranged
to drop the wings in case of necessity to insure floating
in the water. 11
Regarding the Air Service's state of training, he charged:
..Our bombardment has been stopped, the training of it;
we have had no training with heavy bombs for two years. Our
men are fed up with flying and they are disgusted with the
work. Some of the men are up in Maine now shooting moose
trying to get on their feet.
.
9
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An interesting reversal of the old Navy dictum that
only the Navy could fly over water. MJM
11
No specifications exist for any such airplane then or
since. Moreover, the wings would help rather than hinder flotation.
Billy may have referred to an Engineering Division proposal, or
possibly to a conceivable modification of the Fokker T-2. MJM
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Billy brought up again the accusation of coercion.
Captain James G. Moore of the Marine Corps had testified that
"practically all flyers back Mitchell's proposal but do not
12
dare to cone up and say so." Billy stated that there was indeed
coercion, both direct and indirect.
"Right up there," he said, pointing to the spectators'
seats, "is a representative of the General Staff with a steno-
grapher, taking down everything I say."
Congressman Carl Vinson (D-Ga.) asked mildly: "That does
not coerce you, does it?"
Billy laughed. "It d< es not coerce me, not a bit!"
After this exchange, Billy launched into a fervent appeal
that people listen to him. Referring to the War Department , he said:
With regard to the number of projects that they have
delayed, disapproved and about which they have never answered
at all, I will not read them over; there are any number of them.
It comes up every time. I do not think that any report that I
have ever put in myself - not that my reports are worth any-
thing in particular - but I refer to certain of my reports
with regard to details of foreign service - and they have never
received consideration at all by the whole body of our General
Staff of the War Department. Individuals have considered them,
but not the whole body. I have never been asked to come up there
and explain them personally at all, never once. The thing has
been shoved aside, put over, pigeon-holed and put aside. That
thing cannot be done nowadays, gentle nen. It has got to be
listened to and regarded because it is an important thing. xa
On the subject of his unified service proposal and his
criticism of the Navy, he pleaded:
We have criticized our step-sister services pretty
strongly in this proposition. We do not mean any harm to them,
but we want them to develop along their own lines, and to let
12
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us develop along our own lines, and get together ... If
there is any difference between us, let us have some fellow
over us who will tell us to get together on this or get
together on that. This is our whole proposition absolutely
and entirely. 13
In general, Billy's tone before the Morrow Board was so
querulous that it is probably not surprising that the board's
findings were not encouraging to air development. The temper of
some members of Congress was not encouraging either, although their
public statements betrayed an abysmal lack of knowledge of the
military and what it was doing. On October 14th Representative
Martin B. Madden (R. ), Chairman of the House Appropriations Com-
mittee, testily blasted the armed services for "wasting money on
14
experiments and technical research"! And on the same date Rep-
resentative John F. Miller (D-Wash. ) , addressing a Kiwanis Club
gathering in Seattle, declared himself opposed to a unified
service and a secretary for air "because the President, under
the Constitution, is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy,
and arbitrary power over any other department is denied him . .
.
15
The President would have no supervision over the air . i*.
Legalistic sophistry like this was not unusual at the time.
Billy Mitchell later dismissed the Morrow Board as a
committee dominated by financiers and monopolists, and asserted
19
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that it "made no^attempt to support any definite policy except
to make money." Since the membership included the distinguished
Mr . Dwlght Morrow, as well as Senator Bingham, an air power ex-
ponent, Mr. Howard Coffin, formerly of the Crowell Eoard, Repre-
sentative Carl Vinson and Billy's old associate General Harbord,
this accusation does not ring true. It is true, however, that
the board proposed very little of a constructive nature.
Before the hearings were finished, though, more vital
concerns loomed on Billy's horizon. On October 23th he was
served notice of the forual charges against him, and his final
ordeal was ready to begin.
i * * * # * *
The American public, as reflected and as guided by its
press, obviously had a hard time making up its mind about the
prospective court-martial. Some papers, notably the Hearst
press, were volubly pro-Mitchell, others were as clearly opposed
to him. fJome tried to take a position they considered fair, but
laany of these revealed appalling na:l /ete in their opinions on
the case.
A reflection of the confused but articulate press atti-
tude at the time can best be gained by reviewing some direct
quotations
.
From the pro-Mitchell Chicago Journal , October 1st,
under a banner headline: "THE ARMY & NAVY FUROR.* THREE CHEERS
FOR THE RED, WHITE & BLUE! ...If Colonel Mitchell makes good
16
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his charges and then in severely punished for insubordination,
the people will raise a frightful howl. The pussy-footing and
side-stepping Wilburs and other bureaucrats would better keep
out if the way of the propellor."
From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
,
October 2nd, a cartoon
by Ireland, shows an eagle labeled "Mitchell" asking a penguin
("Navy") and a rooster ("Army"): "Tell me, v/hat do you birds
know about flying?" The flightless birds ar*e shown replying:
"How dare you, sir? We've studied flying for years.'"
From the Houston Chrr r icle
, October 5th, a letter from
J.M.Hutchinson, Houston aviator and editor, urging Mitchell's
appointment as Air Secretary under a unified set-up.
From Hearst's Chicago Evening American
, October 9th:
"...While the head of the Army was watching the stock ticker in
New England, Colonel Mitchell, in a flying machine, was watching
enemy flyers and fighting on the ground below. The real jury in
the Mitchell matter is the American public; and not Mitchell, but
army and navy management is on trial before that jury."
From the Miami Herald , October 22nd: "This (the trial)
is more good luck for the colonel. It will keep his name before
the people ...The public is with this officer who has the temerity
to criticize those higher up ... Colonel Mitchell is clever. He
has forced the hands of the administration. If it failed to try
him, it would be an admission of guilt. If it does, it will afford
him more publicity." No explanation is given as to just what
good this publicity would do Mitchell.
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From the Tampa Tribune , October 22nd, a fantastically
naive comment: "Bryan Mack recently, through the Tribune
,
suggested Colonel Mitchell as the next Democratic nominee (for
President). The policy court-martial may make him that. And
persecution by the administration, resented naturally by the
people, will be very likely to elect him.
"
The South Bend News-Times
, November 1st: "If the rule
of silence applied to the army, then it can be applied with
equal severity to every other department of the government . .
.
The President is the accuser and the final judge, an inconceivable
situation . . . The trial may < urn the tide for or against a
bureaucratic government in the U.S."
From the Oakland (Cal.) Post-Enquirer
,
November 3rd:
"If -here were never any insubordination against official
stupidity, what would happen to progress in the world?"
Cartoonist Reynolds of the Portland Oregon!an sent
Billy a copy of his cartoon of October 10th, with a penciled
note: "Success to you, General Mitn^ell, in your efforts to oust
17
all the 'Ivory-Domed Dodoes*. The country is with you."
William Randolph Hearst, in a letter to all his papers
on September 10th, called for support of Mitchell's plan for
unified armed services.
A substantial section of the press was directly and
distinctly opposed to Mitchell. In spite of the personal sentiments
expressed by its cartoonist, the Portland Oregonian editorialized
17
Copy of tfc'Is cartoon, with inscribed message , in
the Mitchell Papers, Library of Congress.
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on September 8th:
It Is common experience that no cause, however meritorious
,
is served in the long run by intemperate utterance ... If a
good many of the statements he has made are true, they suffer
the disadvantages of association with others which nearly
obviously are not, and the colonel has sacrificed force where
he has given way to spleen... A most difficult man to deal
with, withal, since he has cunningly prepared the way for a
martyrdom which can serve in no possible way to advance the
primary purpose of the investigation (of the "Shenandoah")
From the Indianapolis Star
,
September 7th: "If they would
do something specially drastic there is probably no punishment
they could inflict that would be more cruel than to pay no
attention to him."
The New York Times
,
adopting a more hostile position than
it had taken in the past toward Billy, editorialized on September 11th
If an officer can make charges reflecting upon the Integ-
rity of hie superiors without being called to account there
will be an end to discipline . The army will be in danger of
demoralization. The first offender will have many imitators
among officers and men . . . and correction by court-martial
will fall into contempt. There are elements in the country
that would applaud such a condition in the army and make
sinister use of it.
On SepteiLjer 14th, the Times commented "..he (Mitchell)
may not be so sure as he has been that he is the one man in the
world who knows all about aviation."
Straddling the fence on this knotty -Issue were a good
many editors. Commenting on the welter of charges and counter-
charges, the I alias Times-Herald observed on November 11th:
"That f s what makes his trial so interesting to so many people.
They would like to know who's right?"
In the same vein, the Duluth News-Tribune commented on
September 9th: "He is either a hot-headed •shootmouth* or a
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patriot of rare moral courage, and the country Is entitled to
know which he Is."
Finally, from the Washington Dally News of October 7th:
"An autocracy like the old Prussia . . . could simply Issue the
order and a smart military machine would spring forth. We have
to wait on public opinion, notoriously prone to doze and mighty
hard to wake. It sometimes takes a Mitchell to do it, dangerous
as such episodes certainly are."
It was the semi-official military newspapers which were
most guarded during the pre-trial period. The Army-Navy Register
printed the entire text of Mitchell's "Shenandoah" statement
without comment. In the ensuing weeks it presented Billy's
testimony before the Morrow Board and the news of the forth-
coming court-martial, again without editorial comment. On
October 31st it ventured the following utterly non-committal
statement: "..Discussion among officers of the military-naval
establishment as to the outcome (of the trial) appears to be
divided between two results." Behind the silence lay a certain
amount of nervousness, however, which erupted in a strong editorial
on November 14th. In this issue the Register took issue with an
editorial which had been printed in the Syracuse Telegram . the
Telegram had blasted the military, called the trial a disgrace,
exalted free speech and suggested that the War Office should read
the Constitution. The Register released its pent-up feelings in
the following rebuttal:
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For venomous expletive, concentrated ignorance and
vicious diatribe there has been nothing to surpass this
quotation in all that has been written and printed about
the Mitchell case. For lack of truth, justice, ordinary
common sense and plain decency this editorial might have
been written, with advantage to its composition, by the
village idiot.... It was no friend of Colonel Mitchell who
wrote in these pernicious terms.
The Army-Wavy Journal maintained an equally reticent
demeanor, with the exception of a rather righteous editorial on
September 12th, in which editor E.B.Johns commented: "..Colonel
Mitchell's usefulness to the Army, in the opinion of many officers
who acknowledge that he has done a great deal in interesting the
country in the Air Service, has come to an end. They have felt
for some time that Colonel Mitchell should retire to civil life."
Most significantly, the Army-Wavy Courier , a San Antonio
publication, printed absolutely nothing about the Mitchell case
from its start to its conclusion. Quite evidently the professional
military people were embarrassed by the whole affair. From time
immemorial they had preferred to wash their dirty linen in private
and they regarded the Mitchell business, with all its sensational
publicity, as in decidedly bad taste.
* # * • * *
While the charges against Billy were being prepared, and
while controversy, vituperation and righteous indignation swirled
in the nation's press, the spotlight swung for a few days to
Omaha, where the American Legion was holding its annual convention
President Coolidge had been invited to address the convention, and
at the same time Mitchell supporters were anxious to make Billy's
cause a hot issue. Possibly to avoid embarrassing the President,
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the Legion did not invite Billy. The press was caught in the
middle. On October 5th the Omaha Daily News had headlined
"IOWA LEGION TO BACK COLONEL MITCHELL TO THE LIMIT!" On the
same day it was revealed that Billy had not been invited. The
following morning the South Bend News wailed: "A Lost Chance ...
Why not have Mitchell speak to A.L. Convention?"
Had any doubt existed as to the President's position in
the Mitchell case, it was dispelled when he addressed the legion-
naires on the 6th of October. Clearly expressing the pacifist,
disarmament-minded sentiment of the time he said "Our people have
had all the war, all the taxation, and all the military service
18
they want." Without mentioning Mitchell's name, the President
went on: "..that any organization of men in the military service
bent on inflaming the public mind for the purpose of forcing
governmental action through the pressuee of public opinion is an
19
exceedingly dangerous undertaking and precedent." It is note-
worthy that Coolidge alluded to an "organization of men" rather
than just one man. The implication seems clear that he associated
Billy's inflammatory statements with the Army Air Service as a
whole. After the President's speech the expected floor fight on
the Mitchell issue fell flat, and the convention contented itself
with an innocuous policy statement in favor of military prepared-
ness.
18
Chicago Tribune , Oct. 8, 1925
19
Washington Post , Oct. 7, 1925.
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By the 28th of October all had been made ready. The
charges were drawn up and served on Billy and the court-martial
was ready to convene. The charge was solely violation of the
96th Article of War, the so-called "catch-all" article. In
substance the specifications alleged that in making the state-
ments of September 5th and 9th Mitchell had been insubordinate
and highly contemptuous and disrespectful toward the War and
Navy Departments, and that he had therefore conducted himself
to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.
Clearly the trial was to be concerned with military
discipline only, and not with the truth or falsehood of any of
the accusations Billy had levelled at the high command. Legally,
air power was not on trial. It was simply a matter of an officer's
having made public insubordinate statements about his superiors.
Before this court it was apparent that Billy had little chance
of acquittal, unless he could convince the court that the over-
riding importance of what he had to say justified the extreme
|
statements he had made. At first tempted to act as his own
counsel, Billy thought better of this and retained as his legal
spokesman Congressman Frank R. Reid, Illinois Republican. Reid
proved to be a remarkably tenacious and courageous defender.
As the time for the trial drew close, Billy found the
opportunity for a public gesture that gained widespread favorable
reaction. The magazine Liberty had awarded him a prize of one
thousand dollars for "distinguished moral courage". This money
Billy immediately turned over to Hrs.Zachary Lansdowne, widow
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of the commander of the ill-fated "Shenandoah", to be used for
20
the benefit of the families of the lost crewmen.
At long last October 28th rolled around, and the courtroom
doors closed for the opening session. Now it was no longer a
matter of what the press or public thought. Colonel Mitchell's
career was now in the hands of thirteen senior officers who took
their places on the court. The selection of officers to sit on
this particular court was predictable. A wildly misinformed
article in some newspapers on October 5th had been headlined:
21
"Mitchell Demands Trial by Court of Flying Officers." In view
of the fact that the Manual for Courts-Martial rigidly prescribed
that all members of a court must be of equivalent or higher rank
than the accused, and considering that only two flying officers
(General Fechet and Colonel Chalmers Hall) were of equivalent or
higher rank than Billy, this would clearly have been an impossibility.
It was noteworthy, however, that not one member of the court was
an Air Service officer, nor, as far as is known, had any one of
them ridden in an airplane. The members were distinguished both
by position and by military record, a point stressed by the War
Department in its press release of October 20th, in which it gave
22
a military biography of each member of the court.
20
Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit . ,p.314.
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In order of rank, the men selected to pass judgment
on Billy were:
Major General Charles P. Summerall, Commander of the
IV Corps Area, Governors Island, New York, and former Commander
of the Hawaiian Department. General Summerall would later rise to
the position of Chief of Staff oi the Army.
Major General Robert L. Mowze, Commander of the V Corps
Area, Columbus, Ohio, and holder of the Congressional Medal of
Honor.
Major General Fred W. Sladen, Superintendent , of the
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.
Major General Douglas MacArthur
,
commanding the III Corps
Area, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Scion of a military family
and destined to become Chief of Staff.
Major General William S. Graves, commanding the VI Corps
Area, Chicago, Illinois.
Major General Benjamin A. Poore, commanding the VII Corps
Area, Fort Crook, Nebraska.
Brigadier General Albert J. Bowley, Post Commander,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Brigadier General Sdward L. King, Commandant of the
Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Brigadier General Frank R. McCoy, Commander of the Third
Infantry Brigade, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and director of Japan
relief in 1924.
1S1
Brigadier General Edwin B. Winans, Post Commander,
Fort Clark, Texas.
Brigadier General George LeR. Irwin, Post Commanler,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
Brigadier General Ewing E. Booth, Commandant of the
Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas, and the only member not
a graduate of West Point.
It is worth noting that the War Department saw fit to
assign five of its eight Corps Area Commanders to this court,
also the commanders of three of its top service schools, including
the Military Academy and the General Staff School. Beyond question
this was a high-level court and its members were most distinguished.
Obviously, too, all could be expected to be "organization men",
staunch supporters of regulations, protocol and "the system".
This was not a group calculated to lend a sympathetic ear to
Mitchell's harangues on air power, or to his treatises on the
technicalities of aviation.
In a last minute change the assignment of Trial Judge
Advocate, or prosecutor, was entrusted to Colonel Sherman Moreland,
with Major Allen Wyant Gullion as his assistant. The Law Member
of the court was Colonel Blanton Winship, who distinguished him-
self throughout the trial for his fairness.
The officially designated Defense Counsel was Colonel
Herbert A. White. However the defense was conducted in its
entirety by Congressman Reid.
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At the outset the defense exercised Its prerogative to
challenge members of the court. General Summerall was challenged
for cause, since he had expressed open resentment at Billy's
inspection report of his Hawaiian command the previous year.
General Bowley was also challenged for cause, allegedly because
he had publicly referred to MitoneIX as a "mountebank". These
two challenges were sustained and the officers excused from the
court. Exercising its further right to one peremptory challenge,
the defense asked that General Sladen be excused from the court.
Although no reason had to be given for a peremptory challenge,
it is generally assumed that this action was prompted by a remark
of General Sladen fs that "no officer was worth the powder to blow
23
him to hell unless he was a West Pointer."
General Howze assumed the position of President of the
court. The New York Times made editorial comment on November 5th
that it considered the court "eminently fair" and that "more
latitude was being allowed than usual in military trials." The
highly proper Army-Navy Journal , on October 31st, expressed
satisfaction with the "simplicity and dignity" of the proceedings,
and observed that "the expected air of romance and dash about the
trial is missing." Not everyone was so pleased. Congressman
LaGuardia blurted incautiously in a public statement that "Billy
Mitchell is not being tried by a board of his peers but by a
24
pack of be-ribboned dog-robbers of the General Staff.'" Later
23
Gauvreau & Cohen, Op.cit . ,p. 142.
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Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit . , p. 317.
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when the fiery Fiorello took the stand in Billy's defense, this
statement was thrown up to him. He only backed down to the extent
of saying that he had not been aware that General ItacArthur was
on the court at the time he made his remark. In retaliation,
Major Gulllon sneered: "He (LaGuardia) is beyond my powers of
25
description. Thank Heaven he is t;ui generis!"
In actual fact, the "simplicity and dignity" that so
impressed the Army-Navy Journal was largely attributable to the
War Department's choice of a courtroom. In a conscious effort to
de-glamorize the trial and minimize its importance and dramatic
impact, the department chose the Emory Building, at 1st Street
and Pennsylvania Avenue WW, a ramshackle red-brick storage ware-
house. The courtroom, devoid of a dais or permanent bench, looked
more like a congested office, and there was room for a maximum
of sixty spectators (most of whom were women, according to the
26
Army-Navy Journal ).
To prove the specifications of the charge, the prosecution's
task was simple. Billy had made a public statement which was
undeniable. The defense, on the other hand, had to justify this
statement sufficiently to remove from it the onus of insubordi-
nation, and this was not easy. Congressman Held, armed with volumes
of Billy's detailed data, stated what the defense intended to prove:
25
Gauvreau & Cohen, Op.cit
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"As to Colonel Mitchell's charges of incompetence,
criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of
the national defense, we will prove that his opinion is not
27
only well-founded but that his statements are true."
There being no clear legal precedent for this line of
defense, the Law Member of the court had to rule on its admissi-
bility. Colonel Winship granted permission for the defense to
follow the proposed line of argument, and Reid proceeded to
do so. Point by point, he ticked off the areas in which the
alleged deficiencies woul.l be shown to exist: the "Shenandoah"
disaster, the PN-9 flight, the MacMillan Arctic flight, the
defenses of Hawaii and the Philippines, the obsolete equipment
of the Air Service, the "Flaming Coffins", and the refusal of
the War Department to act on Mitchell's recommendations in
each area.
It was this line of defense that made the Mitchell trial
one of air power. The press took the view that if Mitchell's
charges could be substantiated he would probably be acquitted.
A parade of young air officers took the stand to back Billy's
charges, every one at the risk of his own career. The list reads
like a roster of America's air commanders in World War II;
Henry H. Arnold, Carl A. Spaatz, Robert H. Olds, Herbert Dargue,
Lewis H. Brereton, Harold L. George, Gerald Brant, Horace Hickara,
W.E.Gilmore and W.G. Schauffler. Further color was provided by
27
Mitchell, Ruth, Op.cit . ,p.321.
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the appearance of the "ace of aces" Edward V. Rickenbacker , who
vigorously supported Billy's contentions. The retired Admiral
Sims came to testify, and seconded Billy's allegation that the
Navy put "ignorant and uneducated officers" in top posts. Asked
if this applied to the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
28
Eberle, Sims replied with an emphatic "Yes!" The German
Zeppelin expert, Captain Anton Heinen, was brought is and
testified that ten of the "Shenandoah's" eighteen valves had
been removed and that thus "the safety factor had been reduced
29
from one hundred percent to zero."
In spite of the vigor of the defense, it appeared that
much of the technical testimony was neither impressive nor inter-
esting to the court. From day to day the old line officers seemed,
if anything, bored with the long-drawn-out proceedings; only one,
General King, showed open hostility. Twice his audible comment
"Damn rot.'" drew protests from the defense and a caution from
the Law Member. At times Congressman i3eld's manner rankled with
them. His proclivity for saying "You men" instead of "May it
30
please the court" clearly irritated some of the august members.
28
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The generals on the court were actually in an awkward
position. Whether or not they agreed or sympathized with any of
Mitchell's views (and there is little reason tc suppose that
any of them did), they were still Academy-trained professional
soldiers. They were confronted with an open-and-shut case of
belligerent insubordination. In retrospect it is hard to see
how they could have come up with a verdict other than guilty.
As higher commanders they were certainly aware of the tenor of
a large segment of public opinion - they must have known that a
guilty verdict would be unpopular. On the other hand, it was
clearly brought out in the trial, that the accuser in this case
was no less a personage than the President of the United States.
An acquittal would undoubtedly have cost many of these officers
their high position and their chance of further advancement.
They were thoroughly tired of the sensationalism surrounding the
proceedings, and the Army-Navy Register undoubtedly reflected
their attitude in some of its editorial protests against press
excesses. Blasting a Washington Post editorial of November 15th,
the Register fumed on the 21st: "The impulse to condemn officials
as deliberate liars and cold-blooded murderers is perhaps to be
expected of those who prefer, without molestation, to be driven
into a frenzy by the sensational, of which there has been plenty
31
of late.." A week later the same publication added, "..Certain
generally reputable newspapers that have lately acquired a talent
Army-Navy Register Nov. 21, 1925 (Vol.LXXVIH -2365)
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for scurrility and slander are exercising that proclivity with
32
the abandoned ardor of the yellow Hearst inflictions." It went
on further to flay Arthur Brisbane, whose highly emotional
commentaries were adding Immeasurably to the confusion of issues
In the Mitchell case.
Sensationalism and emotion were not confined to the news-
papers. In the courtroom itself the assistant Trial Judge Advocate,
Major Gullion, had been demonstrating a fine talent for histrionics
and invective. In his final summation, done in the best apocalyptic
manner, Gullion compared Mitchell to Alcibiades, Catiline and
Aaron Burr, and concluded:
"Dismiss from us this flamboyant self-advertiser, this
wildly imaginative, hobby-riding egomaniac, always destructive,
never constructive except in wild non-feasible schemes, and
33
never overly careful as to the ethics of his methods!"
At length the long show was over. On December 17th the
the court closed and went into executive session. Three hours
later it reopened and General Howze announced the verdict:
Guilty. For a punishment formula the court reached back to the
days of George Armstrong Custer, and sentenced Mitchell to
"suspension from rank, command and duty, with forfeiture of all
pay and allowances , for five years .
"
32
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Billy's initial reaction to the verdict was characteristic.
For a moment he sat silent , as did everyone in the courtroom.
He was heard to murmur, almost inaudibly, the two words "Brass
34
ears!" Suddenly he recovered his aplomb and exclaimed: "Why,
these men are all my friends!" Striding forward with a broad
smile, he shook hands with each of his judges, each of whom
35
responded with a warm "Good bye, Billy."
A decision in a court-martial is arrived at by secret
written ballot, the junior member handling the counting and
disposition of the slips of paper used in the balloting. After
Billy's trial had ended, while the crowded courtroom wsis still a
scene of confusion, an enterprising reporter from a Washington
paper made a dash for the wastebasket and gathered up the ballots,
which had apparently not been torn up. By comparing handwritings
he discovered that one member, General MacArthur, had voted for
acquittal. He rushed to Billy with the news. Billy was quite
upset by this impropriety, and sternly oruered the reporter to
drop the matter then and there. The news was not published,
although it became known to a few individuals, including Congress-
man LaGuardia. More than twenty years later, in a letter to
Senator Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.), MacArthur admitted that he
36
had, indeed, voted against the verdict of guilty.
34
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Dwight F* Davis had by this time replaced Weeks as
Secretary of War, and in his command review of the trial he
recommended that Billy's sentence be modified to the extent of
granting one-half his pay and allowances "during the pleasure
of the President." President Coolidge approved this modification,
and on January 25, 1926 confirmed the sentence, further admon-
37
ishing Billy publicly for "defiance toward his superiors."
Under a condition of suspension from rank and duty,
Billy could do absolutely nothing in the service. Moreover, he
would still be subject to court-martial if he spoke out of turn.
Accordingly, on being notified of the confirmation of his sentence,
he submitted his resignation from the Army effective February 1st,
1926, terminating twenty-seven years of service. His resignation
was accepted with alacrity and undoubted satisfaction by the
President. In less than a year's time, something had been done
about that "buzzard".
Public reaction to Billy's conviction was mixed, but the
loudest protest came, of course, from Ms sympathizers. The
conservative Outlook adopted an I-told-you-so attitude, and
opined on December 30th, 1925, that "the great majority of thought-
ful and informed people are convinced that the maintenance of
elementary order in the Army required his trial and conviction."
On the other hand, the Literary Digest , on January 2nd, 1926,
presented what it considered the consensus nationally, that
"despite his technical guilt, Mitchell has done the country a
service.
"
37
Levine
,
Op.cit
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p . 370
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Approving the verdict, the New York Times nodded sagely
and observed on December 18th that "the verdict is a vindication
of army discipline, and the deliberation with which it was arrived
at deprives Colonel Mitchell of the pose of martyrdom. The judges
have performed an unpleasant duty fearlessly and honorably."
It further suggested on December 21st that "the proceedings
changed few, if any, opinions."
In contrast to this calm appraisal, Congress had an
oratorical field day. Billy's defenders soared to lyric heights,
comparing him favorably with Columbus, Servetus, Savonarola,
Joan of Arc, Galileo and Socrates. Representative John L. Tillman
(Dem.-Ark.) took to verse in his peroration:
So the struck eagle, stretched upon the plain,
No more through rolling clouds to soar again,
Viewed his own feather on the fatal dart,
And winged the shaft that quivered in his heart. 8
Congressman Frank Keid, Billy's counsel, bitterly reviewed
the proceedings in a public statement released to the press on
January 25th:
..This whole proceeding, from start to finish, the
preliminary investigation, the preferment of the charges,
the ordeal of the trial, the convening of the court, the
conduct of the prosecution in court, the verdict, the sentence,
the approval of the Judge Advocate General, the approval
of the Secretary of War and now the President's quick action -
shows that an invisible mind and hand have labored without
ceasing for this day's verdict ...They have finally got (sic)
Colonel Mitchell. 39
38
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In remarkable contrast was the resigned attitude of
Billy's flying associates and closest friends. As "Hap** Arnold
admitted later - "We all knew there was no other way - In
40
accordance with the Army code, Billy had had it coning."
Probably as revealing a manifestation of military reaction
to the whole episode was to be found in the pages of the current
issue of the Army-Navy Courier
, published in Fort Sam Houston,
wtsre the whole disturbance had begun. Hev,:, where public interest
in the Mitchell cat d could be expected to have been at its peak,
this paper contained the following items in its issue cf
January-February, 1926:
An article on pioneer aviation, by Lt .Col.^enjaiain D. Foulols.
An article on aviation medicine.
A monograph : "Aviation in National Defense" by Admiral
William Moffett (!)
An illustrated article on naval aviation training.
An article "Aviation in the National Guard".
An illustrated spread on the new Air Service Primary Flying
School at Duncan Field, San Antonio.
In the entire *ssue was not one word about the Mitchell
trial, nor was Billy's name mentioned even once. In a foresh- dowing
of George Orwell's 1334 it would appear that in San Antonio
military circles at least, Billy Mitchell had become an "unperson".
And back on his farm near Middleburg, Virginia, William
41
Mitchell, civilian, listed his occupation as "Breeder of Horses".
40
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CHAPTER VII.
WHAT DID BILLY MITCHELL ACCOMPLISH ?
I The public reaction immediately after the announcement
of Billy Mitchell *s sentence must have been most discouraging
to him unless all he had ever wanted was personal publicity.
Vocal friends he had aplenty, but these friends insisted 6n
championing his cause as an individual rather than working for
the national defense goals that were Billy's real aim. In
Congress his supporters were far more concerned, it seemed, in
righting the supposed injustice to Billy than in fighting for
his ideas.
Fiorello LaOuardia was characteristically quick to act.
On December 26th, only a few days after the conviction, the
fiery New Yorker was urging passage of a bill to limit any
penalty imposed under the 96th Article of War to thirty days
suspension from duty. In alluding to this proposal the Army-Navy
Register either erroneously or deliberately referred to its
sponsor as "Rep . LaGuardia of New York - Socialist." Far more
asinine was the joint resolution introduced by Representative
Blanton of Texas, which provided for:
(a) abolition of courts-martial in peacetime,
(b) immediate appointment of Mitchell as Chief of the
Army Air Service,
1
Army-Navy Register , Jan. 2, 1926.
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(c) suspension for five years of Generals Hugh A. Drum
and Dennis Nolan of the Army General Staff (why these two par-
ticularly is not quite clear),
(d) reduction to half-pay for five years of Generals
2
King and Graves, members of the court.
That such nonsense could even be admitted to consideration
in the Federal legislature would be depressing enough in itself,
but this sort of extremism tended to cheapen and downgrade all
efforts expended in Mitchell's behalf. Even the more positive
signs of support were tainted with sensationalism, like the brief
but shrilly proclaimed campaign to have Billy appointed New York
3
City's Police Commissioner.
Billy conducted himself with dignity. He did not keep
quiet - indeed could he ever? But he refused to capitalize on
his questionable publicity for political purposes or for personal
gain. True, it appears that he insisted on substantial fees for
personal appearances and lectures, and the New York Times took
him to task, inquiring "Why does Mitchell demand considerable
guarantee of payment before lecturing?. . .This will detract from
4
his message." The Times was apparently forgetting that Billy's
entire pay and allowances had terminated.
2
New York Times , December 21, 1925.
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Notably, In spite of the oratorical fireworks, Congress
took no action whatever to remedy the conditions in the Air
Service that Billy had deplored so thoroughly. A slight step
forward was taken later in 1926 when the Air Corps was established
and appropriations were granted for development of a limited
number of new aircraft, but the improvement was more apparent
than real. Moreover, the officers who had testified in Billy's
defense felt the effect of departmental wrath almost immediately.
All were either reprimanded or "exiled" to far-off or unimportant
assignments, and their slow progress up the career ladder was
5
stalled for several years. The affable "Hap" Arnold was hard
put to maintain his aplomb when he found himself assigned to the
Cavalry School at Fort Riley, serving directly under General Booth,
6
junior member of the court-martial.
The Air Corps Act of 1926 gave the air branch an organiza-
tional status theoretically equal to the combat arms (Infantry,
Cavalry, etc.) although on a far smaller scale. Aircraft were
ordered and developed to replace the dreary parade of DH-4's,
and model number designations of new aircraft multiplied like
rabbits. Actual production of first-line planes, however, was
another thing entirely. In the eight years from 1926 through 1933
a grand total of 2,496 aircraft of all types was ordered for the
Air Corps. Of this total 771, or almost a third, were Army
5
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Observation types designed to carry out a function that dated
back to the Signal Corps days. A further 709 were training or
utility-cargo types. In an eight-year period only 1,016 primary
mission aircraft were ordered, and of these none represented a
7
significant improvement in performance over their 1925 predecessors.
The deadly weakness of the Air Corps from an equipment standpoint
would be starkly revealed in the so-called Air-Mail fiasco of 1934,
a near-disaster that did more to stimulate public support for
improving the Air Corps than Billy Mitchell ever managed to
8
accomplish.
The Air Corps-Navy feud was destined to continue with
unabated acerbity. In 1937 two of Billy's defenders, then Brigadier
General Arnold and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Olds, would parti-
cipate in a mock bombing test off the California coast, a test
with all the bitter overtones of the 1921 story. As late as 1939
the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force, Lieutenant General
Frank M. Andrews, would be demoted to Colonel and relegated to
Billy Mitchell's little office at "Fort Sam", - for fighting too
9
hard for approval of production of the B-17 "Flying Fortress".
Did Billy Mitchell, then, accomplish anything at all by
his self-sought martyrdom? Certainly he brought air power, the
new weapon, into the limelight, but he o&d already done that
7
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without being court-martial led. Actually, the publicity that the
trial afforded the Air Service was of a questionable sort. The
bitter inter-service rivalry and unseemly personal squabbles that
it brought into the open were hardly calculated to gain public
confidence. Billy had done much more for his service by his
outstandingly successful series of record-breaking flights and
public demonstrations. The trial, as noted earlier, tended to
focus the public attention on Billy the man rather than on the
air power he sought. The aftertaste was bitter in the mouths of
the members of the administration and the policy-makers in the
Army and Navy. Moreover Billy had clearly alienated the sympathies
of a substantial segment of the conservative press, a segment
which had not been hostile before.
If Billy was primarily motivated by a desire to see the
blame for the "Shenandoah" disaster placed where he thought it
belonged, his actions resulted in complete failure. The official
inquiry whitewashed the Navy Department completely, and its air
chief, Admiral Moffett, survived in office. Ironically, Moffett
was destined to perish later on in a similar disaster to the
great airship "Akron", a disaster which would give rise to the
same charges of Navy mismanagement.
Did Billy's martyrdom accelerate the progress of air power
at all, or could it have? Or, conversely, had Billy been acquitted
and allowed to continue his career, could he have done much more
with air power than had been done up to that time? "Hap" Arnold
thinks not, and his view should be worth something. "Despite
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popular legend," he writes, "we could not have had any real air
10
power much sooner than we got it." The state of the art was
just not far enough along, in spite of Billy's optimistic
preaching. Nor does General Arnold feel that the trial retarded
air development to any significant degree. Much of public opinion
was with Billy - he stimulated America's imagination. But imagi-
nation and public opinion cannot advance science overnight. There
was no demand for, much less any real need for, a vast and costly
crash program to push aviation development in 1925. Billion-
dollar efforts such as were expended later on in atomic research
or on ballistic missiles were not the order of the day in the
1920's and even the most rabid air power enthusiast would not
at that time have suggested such a thing.
Up to the end of the decade of the twenties, air science
was feeling its way. In spite of dreams and imaginative schemes,
the key to development of aircraft potential is, and always has
been, the power that can be extracted from an engine. The progress
of aviation has not been a steady climb - it has been a series of
plateaus with steep rises in between, and each of these rises has
been associated with a breakthrough in propulsive power. It was
the attainment of a 660 horsepower engine in 1927 that opened the
way to a new generation of military air -'.'•'aft, the 1,000 horsepower
engine in 1937 to a further leap forward. The jet-turbine engine
was a breakthrough of the first magnitude, and it may well be
the perfection of rocket propulsion that may end the era of the
piloted military aircraft as we have known it. Billy Mitchell
10
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was stretching his wings in a day when the most powerful engine
American industry could give him rated 435 horsepower, and as
his experience with the Barling bomber showed, one can only do
so much with that kind of power. As Arnold said, "People have
become so used to saying that Billy Mitchell was ahead of his
11
time that they sometimes forget it is true."
What about the speed, altitude and endurance records
achieved by Billy's fledgling Air Service? These, unfortunately,
were rather tributes to the skill, daring and ingenuity of the
rather remarkable pilots in Billy's coterie than demonstrations
of the capability of the aircraft of the twenties. In a perverse
sort of way, they blunted the point of some of Billy's contentions
that the airplanes he had were no good. Billy himself cavorted
all over the country in his own DH-4, one of his notorious
"Flaming Coffins", and he made it look good.'
Rather than any of the foregoing, it seems clear that
Billy's most urgent goal and demanding obsession was the reorgani-
zation of the defense establishment. From 1919 until his death in
1936 he pounded continually on this theme, one which in light of
later developments proved to be based on solid ground. The question
whether the air service of the 1920 's would have profited by
being independent of domination by the pround forces is one for
speculation and argument. However the British experience with the
11
Arnold, Op.cjt
. ,
p. 1-30.
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Royal Air Force would suggest that it might have been successful,
especially if the independent air arm had been joined with the
army and the Navy under a unified defense arrangement, which
was not adopted in Britain. On the other hand, it has been
pointed out, with some truth, that the Royal Air Force, in 1038,
was not significantly further ahead than the U.S. Army Air Corps.
The amazing performance of the R.A.F. in the ''Battle of Britain"
was actually a heroic response to a life-or-death challenge, a
triumph by dedicated men working with a marginally adequate
force. The peacetime growth of the R.A.F. gave no inkling of
its capability to develop under the stimulus of war. And this
same observation could well have been made of the American air
arm after Pearl Harbor.
An integrated military air establishment is essentially
built around a bombardment weapon. In retrospect it becomes
evident that Billy Mitchell was merely the first in a series of
air specialists to fight for such a force. Billy fought for
adequate appropriations, support and development to build an
air force around the best bombardment weapon of his time, the
Martin NBS-1. Succeeding struggles of the air power exponents
were centered successively on new stages of bomber evolution.
Andrews and Knerr sacrificed themselves In the fight for the
Boeing B-17, the first high-altitude, long-range bomber. The
next stage, the B-29, was achieved without a struggle because of
the exigencies of war. Later, however, General Royt S. Vandenberg
laid his career on the line In an all-out fight with the Navy
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and certain elements of Congress to gain approval for the
strategic force of intercontinental B-36's. In the 1960 's
General Curtis E. LeMay has fought what seems to have been a losing
battle for the Hach.3 bomber, the B-70.
In comparison with the controversies his successors
became involved in, Billy's proposals were unrealistic in one
major respect. He was campaigning for a kind of air power based
on machines that did not yet exist, where his successors fought
for production of designs, experimental models of which were
already flying. An Air Force built around Martins would not
have had the capability Billy was talking about. To that extent
Billy was a visionary, "ahead of his time", a far-seeing prophet
who tended to be too impatient with the p&e&ent. He refused to
keep in step with the conservative military leaders of his day;
instead he insisted on being an Individual, a daring adventurer,
a bull in a china shop, which made him anathema to his academy-
trained contemporaries.
It has been said that World War II vindicated Mitchell.
It did, in the sense that his strategic ideas were proved to be
true. His warnings about America's inadequate defenses were
certainly justified. T* e later "eleventh-hour prophets", Bouhet
and deSeversky, emphasized this point. !6ri4 War II saw Mitchell's
name given to a highly effective medium bomber, the B-25. And
after the war Congress saw fit to restore Billy's name post-
humously to the honorably retired list, setting aside the verdict
of the 1925 court-martial. But this was mainly a reflection of a
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changed climate of opinion. The holocaust of World War II had
made people remember the man -who had predicted it fifteen and
more years earlier. In effect, it was history that had caught
up with Billy, a man born fifteen years too soon.
In 1942, Major deSeversky, writing in, of all magazines,
Vogue , reminded his readers that Mitchell had been "able to see
far beyond the technical limitations of his day ...Orthodox
military leaders ... treat existing air weapons as though they
12
were fixed and finished." By way of a striking parallel, the
Italian General Giulio Douhet, early in World War I had publicly
criticised the army plan of campaign, for which he was court-
martialled and given a year in jail. After the disaster of
13
Caporetto vindicated his judgment, he was released.
In summary it can be said that Billy Mitchell felt such
a terrible sense of urgency that for him tomorrow was today. He
was a brilliant technician and an utterly fearless soldier, but
his sense of duty was an intensely personal one between him and
his country. An unusually successful organizer of teamwork and
an inspiring leader, he himself could not work in harness. While
his subordinates idolized him, his superiors regarded him with
feelings ranging from uneasiness to downright hostility. It has
been said that there is no room for pri~~ donnas in the military
12
Vogue , Oct. 15, 1942.
IS
Herald-Tribune, (New York) March 1, 1936.
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service, and according to the rulebook this is true. Yet it
is frequently hard to distinguish the genius from the prims
donna. In Billy's case it was the prima donna that was court-
martialed and the genius that was sacrificed. The cantankerous
rebel was put in his place, but the prophet lived on to become
14
the human symbol of America's air age."
14
deSeversky, Op.cit. , Dedication page.
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TABLE 4
AIR CORPS AIRCRAFT ORDERED BETWEEN 1926 and 1933
I. Primary Mission Aircraft : (Total -1,016)
Pursuit - Curtiss P-i * 93
Curtiss P-2 - 5
Curtiss P-3 - 5
Curtiss YP-5 - 5
Curtiss P-6 - 64
Boeing P-12 - 366
Berliner-Joyce ~-16 - 25
Total 563
Attack - Curtiss A-3 - 154
Curtiss 7A-S - 12
Curtiss A-12 - 46
Total 312
Bombers - Keystone LB's — 82
Keystone B-3,4,5- 88
Curtiss B-2 - 13
Keystone B-6 . 44
* Martin YB-10 - 14
Total 139
* The B-10 was the only modern aircraft ordered during this
period, and it was not mass-produced until 1934.
II. Auxiliary Aircraft ; (Total - 709)
Primary Trainers (PT-3 to PT-11) - 303
Basic Trainers (BT-l & BT-2) - 217
Advanced trainers (AT-1,4 & 5) - 76
Total 596
Miscellaneous Cargo Types 113
III. Army Observation Aircraft : (Total - 771)
Curtiss 0-1 74 Fokker YO-27 - 14
Douglas 0-2 196 Douglas YO-31 - 13
Douglas 0-5 5 Douglas YO-35, 36- 6
Thomas Morse 0-6 - 6 Douglas 0-38 - 156
Douglas 0-7 3 * Loening 0A-1 - 45
Curtiss 0-11 66 * Loening OA-2 9
Consolidated 0-17- 29 Total 771
Thomas Morse 0-19- 176
Douglas 0-25 BS *- Amphibians
.
(1) List does not include one-of-a-kind experimental aircraft.
This accounts for missing numbers in aircraft designations.
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able overlap in treatment of the crucial 1920-25 era. This book
is best for personal recollections and anecdotes.
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fighting for.
Maitland, Lester G. : Knights of the Air
,
Doubleday,Doran,
Nev. York, 1929.
Written by an Air Corps pilot, first to fly from
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